Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda : Local (Re)conceptions Beyond Global Definitions
Abstract
- Abstract
- en In light of global dynamics threatening the social ties that hold societies together, recent research has turned to exploring 'conceptions of social cohesion' in Africa. Focusing on Rwanda, this paper argues that while post-genocide government documents (1999-2012) align with globalized definitions of cohesion—emphasizing inclusive identity, trust, and cooperation—Rwanda's approach to rebuilding national unity is deeply rooted in localized notions. Rwandan notions of social cohesion revolve around 'culture' and 'kinship,' which throughout history have played a crucial role in (re)framing social orders in response to inter-group conflict and shifting conceptions of the nation. This case study suggests that beyond trust in institutions and fellow citizens, understanding the normative narratives and cultural frameworks that define social order, as well as the population's familiarity with these, is crucial to assessing cohesion—especially in contexts of nation-building where social trust has been eroded by violent conflict.
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- Full text
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University of Bayreuth
African Studies
WORKING PAPERS
Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda
Local (Re)conceptions Beyond Global Definitions
Erika Dahlmanns, 2025
academy reflects 13
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (LVII)
57
University of Bayreuth
African Studies
WORKING PAPERS
Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide
Rwanda
Local (Re)conceptions Beyond Global Definitions
CC-BY 4.0
Erika Dahlmanns, 2025
ii
Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda
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Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda
About the Author
Erika Dahlmanns was a visiting researcher at the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence in
Bayreuth in 2023. Previously, she conducted research on the integration of judicial systems in
Namibia at the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, University of Pretoria. She
completed her PhD in anthropology on unity politics and art in post-genocide Rwanda at the
Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies. Her research interests currently focus
on social cohesion and mediation practices in Africa.
v
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (LVII)
Abstract
In light of global dynamics threatening the social ties that hold societies together, recent research
has turned to exploring 'conceptions of social cohesion' in Africa. Focusing on Rwanda, this paper
argues that while post-genocide government documents (1999-2012) align with globalized
definitions of cohesion—emphasizing inclusive identity, trust, and cooperation—Rwanda's
approach to rebuilding national unity is deeply rooted in localized notions. Rwandan notions of
social cohesion revolve around 'culture' and 'kinship,' which throughout history have played a
crucial role in (re)framing social orders in response to inter-group conflict and shifting
conceptions of the nation. This case study suggests that beyond trust in institutions and fellow
citizens, understanding the normative narratives and cultural frameworks that define social
order, as well as the population's familiarity with these, is crucial to assessing cohesion—
especially in contexts of nation-building where social trust has been eroded by violent conflict.
Keywords: Social cohesion, Rwanda, genocide, reconciliation, identity politics, social identity,
conflict transformation, conflict resolution, culture, kinship, tradition, Itorero, Intore, national
unity, nation-building, national identity, narratives, intermarriage.
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (LVII)
CONTENTS
Institute of African Studies (IAS)
ii
Academy reflects
iii
About the Author
iv
Abstract
v
Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Local (Re)conceptions Beyond Global
Definitions
1 Introduction: Exploring Conceptions of Social Cohesion in Rwanda
1
2 Social Cohesion in Rwanda: Recent Conceptions and Historical Preconditions
2
3 Concepts of Social Cohesion: Culture and Kinship
4
4 Culture and Cohesion: A Nation of Chosen Warriors (Intore)
7
4.1 Main Attributes: Patriotism, Nobility and Performance
8
4.2 Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions: United for the National Cause
9
4.3 Spatial and Temporal Scope: Cultural Roots and National Reconceptions
9
5 Kinship and Cohesion: Descent and Intermarriage
10
5.1 Main Attributes: Exclusion and Integration
11
5.2 Spatial and Temporal Scope: Changing Visions of Origin and Types of Cohesion
11
5.3 Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions: The Children and the Father of the Nation
12
6 Rwandan Conceptions of Cohesion
12
7 Tables: Central Attributes of Rwandan Concepts of Social Cohesion
16
8 References
19
9 10 Latest Publications in the Academy reflects Working Paper Series
25
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (LVII)
Social Cohesion in Post-
Genocide Rwanda
Local (Re)conceptions Beyond Global Definitions
Erika Dahlmanns
1. Introduction: Exploring Conceptions of Social Cohesion in Rwanda
In light of global social dynamics threatening institutions, norms, and identity conceptions that
hold societies together, research on social cohesion has recently shifted towards exploring the
diversity of what could be termed 'cultures of cohesion.' This shift aligns with a cultural turn in
peace studies, emerging from the growing recognition that universal normative frameworks often
fail to capture local realities, which are crucial for understanding and supporting conflict
resolution and peace consolidation (see e. g. Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Richmond 2005). It
is within this context that the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) initiated
research on 'Social Cohesion in Africa' to explore how social bonds within populations and
between citizens and their state are understood, constructed, and sustained across various
African contexts (Leininger et al. 2021). However, this endeavour requires a nuanced
understanding of historical and cultural particularities, as these have profoundly shaped local
manifestations and interpretations of social cohesion, enabling a more comprehensive
understanding of their implications on the ground.
This paper was written within the framework of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence1 and
explores "localized conceptions of social cohesion" in Rwanda as part of the IDOS project, drawing
on my previous research into post-genocide unity policy, arts, and foundational narratives in
Rwanda (Dahlmanns 2016). I argue that while post-genocide government documents (1999–
2012) align with internationalized definitions of social cohesion—emphasizing inclusive identity,
trust, and cooperation linking citizens to one another horizontally and to the state on a vertical
1 This article is an outcome of my guest fellowship at the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence at the University of
Bayreuth, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s
Excellence Strategy – EXC 2052/1 – 390713894.
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Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda
level (as summarized by Leininger et al. 2021)—Rwanda's approach to rebuilding national unity
is deeply influenced by its unique historical and cultural context. Localized conceptions of
cohesion in Rwanda are anchored in long-standing normative notions of 'culture' and 'kinship,'
which have shaped changing narratives of social order since pre-colonial times. These notions of
cohesion diverge from more abstract, globalized definitions, as they are deeply rooted in
Rwanda’s collective narratives, whose integrative or exclusive interpretations have shifted over
time in response to inter-group conflict dynamics and changing conceptions of the nation. This,
however, implies that they have not always reflected egalitarian ideals, despite their crucial role
in addressing social inequalities and conflicts.
To better understand the concepts explored, I will first provide an overview of Rwanda's history,
focusing on the influential ideas of social cohesion and the post-genocide nation-building context
in Section 2. In Section 3, I will trace notions of cohesion in government documents from 1999 to
2012, and explore how these relate to ideas of Rwandan 'culture' and 'kinship' to be studied in
more detail in the following sections. Section 4 focuses on the government’s recent concept of
Rwandan culture and identity as promoted through the nation-building government program
Itorero, which aims to create a unified "Nation of Chosen Warriors (Intore)." In this context, the
traditional figure of the Intore warrior is reimagined as a symbol of an exemplary citizen,
embodying particular core values designed to foster cohesion both horizontally, by connecting
citizens, and vertically, by linking citizens with the state. By considering both recent
interpretations and the historical development of the originally pre-colonial military tradition, the
program’s specific conception of cohesion will be outlined. Section 5 explores kinship narratives
as a historically important framework for legitimizing and re/defining a cohesive social order,
tracing back to foundational myths of the kingdom. These narratives have played a role in either
reinforcing or challenging social boundaries and power structures referring to descent and Hutu-
Tutsi intermarriage, conveying a spectrum from egalitarian to hierarchical ideas of cohesion.
Today, narratives of Hutu-Tutsi intermarriage are crucial for rethinking national cohesion as they
challenge established notions of descent-based distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi and promote
an inclusive national identity through age-old notions of common descent. Finally, Section 6
concludes with a summary of the main findings, while the tables in Section 7 provide a detailed
overview of the concepts explored.
2. Social Cohesion in Rwanda: Recent Conceptions and Historical
Preconditions
Apart from cultural unity, the most irrefutable proof of the Rwandan people´s union
was the development of the national consciousness. Tutsi, Hutu and Twa lived in
perfect harmony, aware of being one and unique people, descendants of Gihanga, to
whom the myth attributes the foundation of Rwanda. (NURC 2007: 17, Government
of Rwanda)
[The government] will help Rwandans to rebuild a patriotism culture based on values
of excellency, integrity, equity, heroism and nobles. (NURC 2009b: 25, Government of
Rwanda)
In Rwanda, the dominant notion of social cohesion in government discourse can only be
understood as part of the post-genocide nation-building policy through which the ruling Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) has sought to mobilize the entire population since 1994. It derives its
cohesive force primarily from a normative image of Rwandan culture as the backbone and engine
for recreating a unified, moral, heroic, and performative nation, demanding ultimate commitment
to the nation's cause. Against the backdrop of a history of collective violence and the 1994
3
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (LVII)
genocide against the Tutsi2, its particular character represents an expression of a unique strategy
to address challenges arising from ethicized divisions dating back to the pre-colonial kingdom and
more recent shifts of power. In Rwanda, societal divisions did not result from the imposition of
colonial borders on previously distinct cultural entities but emerged with the structures of the
pre-colonial state (see e.g., Kraler 2001), later instrumentalized for colonial purposes.3
Following the rule of the predominantly Tutsi elite in the Kingdom of Rwanda, privileges for the
pastoralist Tutsi minority were maintained under the colonial administrations of Germany
(1889–1916) and Belgium (1916–1962) through a system of indirect rule that racialized and
rigidified group categorizations, assuming Tutsi superiority and their immigration4. Unlike in
many other colonies, Rwandan colonial borders closely matched the expansion of the realm under
the reign of Rwabugiri (1867-1895) that integrated Tutsi, Hutu and Twa5, sharing one language
and culture. The cohesive social hierarchy that foundational myths of common descent affirmed at
the time reflected a “premise of inequality” (Maquet 1961) upheld in administrative structures of
the state and patron-client-relationships. When the monarchy was abolished by the 'social
revolution' of the Hutu uniting for the rights of the oppressed majority in the pursuit of
independence (see Newbury 1988: “The cohesion of oppression”) the Hutu nationalist policy of
the subsequent two presidential republics turned to the detriment of Tutsi (Lemarchand 1970;
Mamdani 2001). Cohesion in the one-party states was based on the modern nationalist idea of
common origin, focusing on Hutu peasant identity (Verwimp 1999). Violent struggles over power,
waves of emigration of Tutsi − that came to unite in exile to fight for their return in subsequent
years − framed the context for collective violence (see a. o. Prunier 1995; Mamdani 2001).
International pressure for democratization and RPF attacks on Rwanda in the early 1990s became
a pretext mobilizing for genocide, the consequences of which affected the entire Great Lakes
Region (Lemarchand 2009; Guichaoua 1995; Reyntjens 2009).
When the RPF´s armed forces seized power in 1994, ending the genocide, and, at the same time,
the civil war against the Hutu nationalist Government of Rwanda (1990-1994) (Des Forges 1999;
Chrétrien 1995), cohesion became a declared goal of its policy of national unity and reconciliation
(Ubumwe n´Ubwiyunge) and, likewise, central in stabilizing its contested political order. The
RPF's legitimacy was threatened by its responsibility for the attacks on Rwanda, which had fuelled
violence against the country's Tutsi as “enemies from within,” and, moreover, by speculations
around its responsibility for shooting the presidential plane of Habyarimana, in direct response
2 The term “genocide against Tutsi” (Jenoside Abatutsi) was introduced in 2008 to counter allegations of genocidal
violence of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the RPF´s military force, against Hutu. Even though opponents of the
genocidal regime, among them Hutu, were killed during the genocide, genocidal ideology was directed at the
extermination of Tutsi. The estimated death toll of the genocide from April 6 to mid-July 1994 varies between 500,000,
the frequently cited figure of 800,000 (Des Forges 2002: 33-35; Human Rights Watch 1999: 61ff; Reyntjens 1997) and
over one million according to estimates by the Rwandan government, with different criteria and conditions underlying
the calculation (see Straus 2006).
3 With regard to the argument often made in the discussion of social cohesion in Africa that the existing national borders
were artificially imposed by colonial forces, it should be remarked that borders in Europe as well have been militarily
imposed or defined by the powerful, integrating a diversity of social groups, and that the idea of cohesion as based on
homogeneity can be assigned to the realm of modern nationalism itself. In the case of Rwanda, ethicized divisions are a
product of the local political order, even though transformed and infused with colonial racial interpretations.
4 Ideas conveyed in Speke´s „Theory of Conquest of Inferior by Superior Races” (Speke 1863: 246-252), known as
Hamitic Theory, were formative in the consideration of Rwandan society and were later referred to as the Hamitic Myth
because of its infusion of baseless and speculative elements (Sanders 1969).
5 A census in the 1930s, relying on self-assignment, recorded 14% Tutsi, 85% Hutu, and 1% Twa in the country's
population (see Des Forges 2002: 63, footnote 8; Mamdani [2001] 2007; Marx 1997).
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Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda
to which the genocide was launched on April 6th (Lemarchand 2009: 93; Prunier 1995). The RPF-
led transitional “Government of National Unity”6, that derived its moral authority from the merit
of having ended the genocide,7 began to rebuild the devasted country8 and − in spite or because
of its rootedness in a diasporic Tutsi tradition − emphasized an overarching Rwandan identity in
order to unite Hutu, Tutsi and Twa9 (Des Forges 2002: 814-815). The RPF´s victory was to mark a
national dawn, liberating all Rwandans from divisive and genocidal forces, envisioning a new
Rwanda (Rwanda rushya) linked to imageries of a Golden Age-like original state as a unified,
peaceful and strong pre-colonial “nation” (see e. g. Pottier 2002; Des Forges 2002). Centrally, its
policy has sought to derive its cohesive force from levelling out the significance of ethicized
categorizations10, high levels of mandatory participation of the population by focusing on
homegrown solutions, and culture as a tool and unifying factor for development.
Under the leadership of RPF-General Paul Kagame, in power since 2000, the government's
development and internal security policies, while declared to promote democratic reforms, have
been criticized for authoritarian tendencies (see, e.g., Reyntjens 2008, 2013; Straus and Waldorf
2011), but at the same time largely recognized for notable development achievements. The
growing capital city of Kigali reflects the economic upswing of this small, hilly country of only
26,338 km², which now has a population of about 13 million. Urban development, however,
continues to contrast with the severe poverty of the predominantly rural population (more than
90% live in rural areas from agriculture) and the misery of those pushed to the urban outskirts
(see Ansoms 2008). Economic growth was 4.69% in 2013, rising to 8% in 2020 (UNDP 2020). In
2012, the Human Development Index ranked Rwanda 162 out of 187 countries. In 1994, it was
still one of the ten poorest countries in the world.
3. Concepts of Social Cohesion: Culture and Kinship
Rwandese culture has many important things that we can restore together and which
can help us […] reestablish unity. […] Culture […] educates its children, and people say
´The way you are educated is better than the way you are born´. (Government 1999:
73-74)
Rwanda was to be rebuilt in a "spirit of social cohesion," according to the paradigm articulated in
Article 8 of the Preamble of the National Constitution (2003) to "draw from our centuries-old
history the positive values which characterized our ancestors that must be the basis for the
6 The transitional government integrated smaller parties not involved in the genocide in accordance with the Arusha
Peace Accords (1993) under Hutu president Bizimungu, replaced in 2000 by General Paul Kagame, a Tutsi and leading
figure of the RPF´s Liberation War.
7 Commemorations of the genocide and its designation as the 'Genocide against the Tutsi' (2008) later faced criticism
for reproducing simplified victim-perpetrator dichotomies and for promoting the inappropriate notion of collective
guilt among the Hutu (Vidal 2001; de Lame 2003; Brandstetter 2005, 2010).
8 With the end of the genocide Rwanda experienced an exchange of large parts of its population: Hundreds of thousands
of Tutsis returned from exile, some of them estranged to their native language. The government faced a destroyed
infrastructural and social fabric with around 800.000 Tutsi and opponents murdered in genocide, an unknown number
of persons killed by the RPA during its war and more than an estimated million internally displaced, thousands detained
in camps for genocidal crimes. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands, many of them involved in the genocide, had fled to
neighbouring countries, representing a declared threat to the regime. (Marx 1997: 151; Reyntjens 1994: 2).
9 In the local language Kinyarwanda, the terms Umuhutu, Umututsi, and Umutwa (singular) and Abahutu, Abatutsi, and
Abatwa (plural) are used. The prefixes Umu- and Aba- indicate the article. In this text, the European spelling without
the prefixes will be used.
10 The government (unlike in Burundi) refrained from introducing a quota based on ethnic categories, which had
previously been important for access to social, political and economic resources (Schraml 2012).
5
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (LVII)
existence and flourishing of our Nation." In the political narrative of the new order, the journey
toward unity (Ubumwe) is imagined as a return to one's own moral principles and strengths,
rooted in a genuine tradition. At its core, the government's new unity narrative of national history
was a nativist narrative of cultural decline and revival. It called on Rwandans to reunite in the
name of their culture in order to rebuild and nurture their moral dignity and strength,
externalizing the blame for societal divisions and internal violence by blaming the colonial
destruction of society's cultural foundations for the deterioration of social cohesion: „to be forced
to abandon our culture is the origin of misfortune which Rwanda has undergone and is still
undergoing.“ (Government 1999: 73) The normative imagery of Rwandan culture, defined against
this background, was to create an inclusive identity that focused on morality and heroic
commitment to national concerns in order to mobilize the population for cooperative work for the
development of the nation. (For details see Dahlmanns 2017: 81-86)
In the government’s foundational narrative, the precolonial Golden Age of the kingdom –
dispraised in Hutu nationalism as Tutsi tyranny – ends with the colonial destruction of its moral
and unifying culture, thus providing a breeding ground for divisive ideologies, leading to national
decline. This cultural uprooting deteriorates the society´s fundament of the Hutu-Tuti-Twa-
trinity, affirmed in old Kinyarwandan sayings like “Imbaga yʼinyabutatu”, as well as in unifying
foundational myths of common descent from the mythical father Gihanga (see Mensching 1987;
Nkundabaganzi 1961: 35-37; The History of Rwanda 2010: 38, for details see Section 5.2.).
The government’s nativist narrative portrays all Rwandans as victims of cultural uprooting and
calls upon them to unite for cultural revival, framed as a revolutionary struggle for independence.
This struggle is declared to be a self-liberating fight against divisive forces and as a continuation
of the RPF’s Liberation War. And it is imagined as the completion of Rwanda's independence,
which the government claims the previous Hutu-led governments failed to achieve by not
liberating Rwandans from a divisive mentality. Although the new foundational narrative opposes
the old Hutu nationalist tales, it notably integrates their key slogans − the “fight against a colonial
mentality” (once associated with the Tutsi)11, “social revolution” and “independence” − which in
their reinterpretation unfold a potentially integrative connotation to the support of RPF´s vision
of a cohesive nation. (Dahlmanns 2017: 80ff)
According to the government's reasoning, the new order is to be rebuilt through a revitalization
of Rwandan culture, conceptualized as an inherently consistent yet flexibly mouldable medium
for promoting cohesion and national development. “The Rwandan culture [...] has to continuously
be harmonized and renewed to meet the current needs. It has to play a major role in the country´s
social, political and economic development.” (MINISPOC 2008: 6) In the context of this culturalist
conception, the government, both in addressing the violent past and in relation to the country’s
reconstruction, has promoted high levels of mandatory participation and revived adapted
traditional resources as 'homegrown solutions' to achieve its goals: The Gacaca courts were
introduced for prosecuting genocidal crimes and reconciliation on the communal level (operating
from 2002 to 2012, on Gacaca see a. o. Ingelaere 2018), genocide convicts were to contribute to
re-building the country and support genocide survivors in the Travaux d’Intérêt Général (TIG).
The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), founded in 1999, became the central
organ for re-education, organizing o. a. Ingando Solidarity and Re-education Camps to foster
cohesion, teaching the new version of national history and policy goals o. a. for ex-combatants,
prisoners, for returnees from the diaspora and for youths including military training (on Ingando
11 Unlike in most postcolonial African states, independence was not celebrated as liberation from European colonial
power, but as a victory over a "colonization by the Tutsis". (Lemarchand 1970; van Linden 1977; Mamdani 2001).
6
Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda
see Mgbako 2005; Thomson 2011; Prudekova 2011). Monthly, Rwandans join in their
neighbourhood for the mandatory nation-wide communal labour Umuganda ("coming together in
common purpose"). Traditional arts and rituals of sharing, particularly Ubusabane, a joint practice
of sharing a drink from a pot of sorghum beer, are to strengthen communal ties – an idiom that
contemporary arts and Rwandans often cite referring to cohesion (see Dahlmanns 2008; see also
de Lame 2005: 306), in a Rwandan proverb opposed to the uniting principle of descent: "United
are men not by blood, but by sharing."- "Abantu ntibava inda imwa; bava inkono imwe."12
In spite of the government’s aim to diminish descent-oriented, ethicized identifications by
emphasizing cultural unity and civic identity (Buckley-Zistel 2006), affirmations of both former
and new kinship bonds remain central to local imaginations of social cohesion, particularly in
reference to Hutu-Tutsi intermarriage and the kingdom’s foundational myths of descent. They
resonate with the government’s unity narrative, which evokes images of pre-colonial harmony
and the strength of the kingdom. These ideas are similarly reflected and contested in the ways
Rwandan society is imagined by the population (for details see Dahlmanns 2008, 2017: 107-124;
see also Eltringham 2004).
Although early narratives of unity (Ubumwe) trace back to the oral traditions of the kingdom,
linking the Abanyarwanda (Rwandans) to their king (Mwami) through myths of descent from a
common forefather, Gihanga, these narratives simultaneously defined Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa as
unequal brothers, each with inherently different moral natures, placing Tutsi at the top, followed
by Hutu, and finally Twa. These foundational myths legitimized existing social inequalities, which
had emerged with the structures of the kingdom, as a God-given order (see Mensching 1987: 29-
30; dʼHertefelt 1969). The “premise of inequality” (Maquet 1961) shaped both horizontal
relationships within the population and its vertical relationship with the state, reinforcing a
cohesive social hierarchy, underpinned by the economic interdependencies of patron-client
relationships.13
Ruled by a pastoralist elite of the Nyiginya clan, calling themselves “Tutsi”, the kingdom had
emerged around the 17th century as one of the early states in the Great Lakes Region with the
development of patron-client relations controlling cattle, land and peasant labour (of those the
elite called “Hutu”, implying subordinate status) and particularly with the establishment of an
army. Its troops (Itorero) expanded and controlled the territory and promoted cultural and
linguistic homogenization by establishing state-like structures linking surrounding regions and
its population to the king´s court.14 Group boundaries, however, had to some extent been
permeable,15 Hutu-chiefs were integrated into the state and overarching, superregional
12 This proverb is quoted in a catalogue of the Rwandan painter O. G. Karagwa referring to his painting "La soif"
(“Thirst”) depicting Ubusabane (Karagwa 1998: 28).
13 In Ubuhake contracts, Hutu were obliged to serve their mostly Tutsi feudal lords for generations in return for the loan
of cattle. But particularly the labour service Uburetwa introduced by King Rwabugiri around 1870, which only Hutu had
to perform for land use after land expropriations, led to economic pressure, increasing social inequality. (See Vansina
2004: 134; Newbury 1988: 74ff, 140ff; Prunier 1995: 13; Kraler 2001).
14 Based on the analysis of oral traditions (Ibiteekerezo) from the 19th century, Jan Vansina traced back the history of
the kingdom to the 17th century (Vansina 1961, 2000, 2004). Genealogies of the kingdom itself date its origin back to
the 10th or 11th century (Kagame 1972, 1975), but can according to the current state of knowledge considered as fiction
promoting a history of kingdom´s greatness.
15 Changing the patrilineally inherited social status was possible through social advancement or relegation, such as
intermarriage, acquired wealth, or appointment to a higher position, or a combination of such factors, although the
frequency of such practices remains unknown: Hutu could attain Tutsi status (Kwihutura) or Tutsis could be
downgraded to a Hutu (Gucupira) (Czekanowski 1917: 242f; Mamdani [2001] 2007: 70; Maquet 1961: 65-66, 135-36;
Lemarchand 1970: 38, 98).
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integrative group categories such as the clan (Ubwoko) – a political entity in Rwanda – existed,
uniting Hutu, Tutsi and Twa.16 At the king´s court, Tutsi elite soldiers called “Intore” (“the chosen
ones”) demonstrated their ultimate military commitment and loyalty to the king, reflecting an
authority-oriented culture that came to persist in national performances of the post-independent
Hutu republics.
In today´s nation-building and development program Itorero ry´Igihugu, the Intore warrior has
emerged as a national ikon, representing national core values to foster cohesion, which on the one
hand ensue from the popularized aristocratic court and military tradition and on the other hand
from newly defined features referring to modern, developmental orientations.
4. Culture and Cohesion: A Nation of Chosen Warriors (Intore)
Itorero is note [sic] a new creation but an endogen opportunity which will help
Rwandans to rebuild a patriotism culture based on values of excellency, integrity,
equity, heroism and nobles. (NURC 2009b: 25)
[I]ts objective is to make every Rwandan Intore. (NURC 2009a:18)
The government program, Itorero ry'Igihugu ("Troop of the Nation"), recreated the pre-colonial
military institution, Itorero, of the kingdom's elite Tutsi warriors, Intore ("the chosen ones"), in
order to integrate the entire population into its nationwide governance structure. By building a
new national community of “chosen people” through civic education and cultural adjustment
trainings (promoting ‘Rwandan values’) the program aimed at countering the impact of
experienced collective violence and inner division to ensure the success of the national
development plan, Vision 2020. Launched in 2007 as an endogenous ("culture-based") instrument
for national rehabilitation after the genocide, Itorero was the government's most far-reaching
program and the first to seek a profound social transformation through a new interpretation of
the ancient tradition. By 2012, more than 3 million Rwandans, or 27% of the population at the
time, had been trained to work for progress in the program's structure, which monitors
participants' Development Performance Contracts (Imihigo), by which they commit to driving
change in their communities. (Dahlmanns 2017: 229-259; NURC: 2009a)
In the past, Itorero were troops where elite Tutsi warriors were trained according to the
aristocratic, military and meritocratic norms of the court, while they are remembered - in the
program - as educational institutions to train citizens to serve the nation: “Yet during colonization
this cultural center [...] was destroyed and its destruction allowed [...] anti-values to emerge
ending up in genocide. [...] We need to reestablish this forum, a common national vision, in order
to [...] agree on values and anti-values. An Intore is someone who has a vision, respects values and
prohibits anti-values. This is what we want to create. We want Intore for Rwanda.”17 The Itorero’s
military function is moved to the background. Remarkably, the link to the Tutsi origin of the
tradition goes unmentioned. Pre-colonial Itorero is presented as an integrative and non-
segregating institution for all Rwandans and, as such, a source of national strength: “In Itorero,
16 In addition to the clan (see d'Hertefelt [1971] 1997), and the lineage (Umuryango) as the larger family association,
affiliations to regional political units and to the administrative-politically significant territorial unit of the hill (Umusozi),
over which the scattered settlements were spread, were significant for the social identity. Rwandans shared the
monotheistic belief in Imana and were included in regional Kubandwa or Ryangombe cult communities (see de Heusch
1964; Vidal 1967).
17 Interview with Government officials of the Itorero Task Force, February 2009/Audio, own translation from French.
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Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda
there was no discrimination or segregation; and this was the weapon that helped Rwandans to
expand and develop their country.” (NURC 2009a: 11)
Instead of the previously hierarchical relationship between Hutu and Tutsi that characterized the
military system (Vansina 2004: 135), the emphasis is now on brotherhood and equality among
the Intore, highlighting a fair meritocratic principle according to which only high achievers are
rewarded and promoted, irrespective of their origin. (NURC 2009a:12) However, a performance-
based hierarchy is legitimized, implying obedience to the program´s ‘command structures’. (NURC
2009a: 11) The new Itorero is to empower Rwandans to unite and efficiently contribute to
“embark on an economic and social revolution” to realize national objectives in their sphere of
influence “by using the Rwandan culture.” (NURC 2009a: 6-7) Remarkably, it includes the leaders
in its democratic approach: The Itorero program is to be “a great pillar for good governance and
democracy as it will help Rwandans and their Leaders to learn more and behave fairly.” (NURC
2009a: 14) Itorero, the government contends, will help Rwanda turn into a cohesive, prosperous,
morally just, and internationally well-respected country: “Itorero ry’Igihugu will help to promote
unity and mutual help in a Rwandan society that is characterized by a culture built on values that
make Rwanda a respected, valuable country, with dignity on the international arena, a great
nation [...] a continuously progressing country, comfortable for all.” (NURC 2009a: 6-7, 14)
4.1 Main Attributes: Patriotism, Nobility and Performance
The figure of the Intore warrior appeals to a psychology typical of nationalisms, causing an
increase in self-esteem through the affiliation to a superior group of the chosen. (Kelman 1997)
The designation “chosen one” emphasizes the belonging to a superior community implying
election for higher tasks. It potentially mobilizes forces that draw on the enhancement of self-
esteem through group-affiliation and performance to the benefit of the nation.
Itorero aims to educate Rwandans on common national values, visions and a patriotic attitude
implying dignity and heroism: “The vision [...] is [...] to have Rwandans: - With a shared mindset
and values to promote their unity and patriotism [...] - Characterized by [...] pride to develop their
country” (NURC 2009a: 16) “to: a) Mentor Intore suitable for the country [...] c) Praise dignity
(ishema) and heroic aspects (ibigwi) of Rwanda and Rwandans.”(NURC 2009a: 16) Thus, a
“culture of volunteerism” is to be established that is symbolized by the Intore warrior, which
represents the ideal citizen and encourages an altruistic service to the nation (“selfless service to
the Nation”(NIC 2011: 4)). An Intore is distinguished by refined intellectual and moral qualities
and always acts in accordance with the interests of the nation. United in brotherhood by their
education and shared cultural values, Intore warriors demonstrate a strong sense of
responsibility to their country. They strive for excellence and the fulfilment of their duties. The
national values they embody include unity, patriotism, integrity, commitment, reliability, and
modesty. (NURC 2009a; NIC 2011)
Heroism (Ubutware) and nobility (Ubupfura) are considered the Intore’s most outstanding
virtues, encompassing the aforementioned values and are central to 'Ubutore,' the Intore’s specific
character. Remarkably, nobility, which under Hutu nationalism was associated with a negative
Tutsi stereotype, now signifies ethical behaviour (faithfulness, credibility, generosity, discipline,
altruism, loyalty, peacefulness) (NURC 2009a: 16; NIC 2011: 20), mitigating some of the negative
connotations of the old Hutu nationalist interpretation. Nobility is now declared a virtue
intrinsically linked to heroism. The heroic commitment to the fatherland becomes a matter of
personal dignity: “The whole life of human being is a very hard struggle, like others that person is
engaged in and must win. Nobility and heroism always go together, better die instead of
misbehaving, and better die instead of being a traitor of the country. A person becomes a hero due
to heroic actions done for his/her country.” (NURC 2009a: 16) Here, it becomes particularly clear
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that the government’s normative conception of culture is to foster an ultimately loyal bond with
the national community, prioritized over individual concerns: “Culture leads the country’s
children who become proud of it, respect it, and lay down their life for it“(Government 1999: 73).
4.2 Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions: United for the National Cause
Cohesion, in this approach, is based on the Intore´s affiliation to a superior group of the chosen
ones, including political leaders, enhancing their value, in which the principle of achievement
alone undermines the emphasized paradigm of equality inter pares. The traditional designation
“chosen one” may by addressing the need for positive self-regard and distinctiveness potentially
create emotional bonds between the individual and the new community and motivate
commitment to the in-group cause (see also Kelman 1997). Moreover, depreciation and exclusion
of those not committed to the national concern, the conjuring of their lack of future prospects, as
proclaimed in speeches and poems of the program (Dahlmanns 2008; 2017: 249-253), may
trigger a psychological impact facilitating the integration of opponents: Assuming that individuals
generally strive for a positive social identity and better life opportunities, the Social Identity
Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) suggests that deprivation and negative connotation of
stigmatized minority groups might encourage their members to switch sides in an effort to gain
self-esteem and economic benefits.
Access to the group of ‘chosen ones’ is open to all loyal patriots irrespective of their origin. The
new patriotism is far from being exclusive, giving after all publicity to the possibility of social
integration through conversion and commitment to one ‘moral culture’ and future vision. The
inclusion into the new national community is a matter of choice and none of descent – even though
recourse to the mythical founding father Gihanga, as cited in songs of the program, may as well
imply a genealogical legitimation of the nation. The members of the chosen community are united
horizontally by a patriotic culture of loyalty, integrity and solidarity to one another, but especially
on a vertical dimension to the nation. The program equalizes individual, national and government
objectives and, at the same time, prioritizes national interests over the value of the individual and
his life by promoting a meritocratic norm, demanding a commitment to the nation up to self-
sacrifice. (→ Table 1)
4.3 Spatial and Temporal Scope: Cultural Roots and National Reconceptions
The government's conception of social cohesion, intertwined with a normative imagery of
Rwandan national culture, clearly relates to the national space and to the individual as the bearer
and agent of its culture. The Itorero program, as the central organ for disseminating its core
values, builds a structure for cooperation and control reminiscent of the pre-colonial army that
was central for integrating the population into the state, promoting cultural homogenization while
also fostering 'class' differentiation. While Hutu nationalism elevated traits of peasant culture to
national culture, the current conception is oriented towards the pre-colonial Tutsi elitist military
culture of the kingdom, of which only the warrior dances survived, popularized by missionaries
who founded dance groups and called converts 'Intore z'Imana' (God's chosen ones). Today, the
Intore warriors are no longer exclusively associated with the Tutsi, but they still demonstrate a
heroic self-image and self-enhancement through successful commitment to the country and its
ruler. (For details see Dahlmanns 2017: 235)
In the kingdom, the Intore, chosen by and at the same time existentially dependent on the king,
celebrated their heroic deeds for king and country. The successful fulfilment of a royal order was
seen as a personal victory, demonstrating the alignment of their individual aspirations with those
of the ruler. In this respect, the Intore’s performances could be viewed as testimonies of loyalty
and a specific form of an African culture of praise (see African praise songs in Vogels, 2001: 503-
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Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda
504). These performances unveiled opportune acclamations of the ruler in the typical portrayal
of acts of violence in the famous poetry genre called Ibyivugo, as ultimately devoted commitment
to king and fatherland (on Ibyivugo see Kagame 1969: 15ff ).
The Intore’s poetry and dance performances presented Rwanda as a victorious kingdom due to
the ultimate endeavours of its warriors. They became a central trait representing the monarchy
and subsequently Rwanda as a nation, 18 reflecting a collective self-image linked to a martial
tradition, as suggested by the still popular saying “Urwanda ruratera, ntiruterwa!” (“Rwanda
attacks and will never be attacked!”), dating back to the 18th century, and other similar sayings
(Vansina 2004: 120). These demonstrations of ultimate commitment, excellence, and competition
illustrated a meritocratic norm of Rwanda’s military that accepted only victory and tolerated no
defeat – “Defeat is the only bad news” (Des Forges 2011). This ethos resonates with the RPF’s
military values and is similarly reflected in today’s performances of the 'Intore' during large
collective celebrations on Itorero Day, where they praise their successful fight for development in
front of the president, praised as the supreme hero and father of the nation. (Dahlmanns 2017:
249-253)
5 Kinship and Cohesion: Descent and Intermarriage
Despite of the government’s aim to diminish descent-oriented ethnic identification by
emphasizing civic identity (Buckley-Zistel 2006), affirmations of former and new kinship bonds
remain central to local political imageries of social cohesion. Government films portray
intermarriages between Hutu and Tutsi as examples of a successful reconciliation policy (Best
Practices 2008). Intermarriage narratives, a prominent theme in theatre plays, literature and films
since the 1950s, explore micro-versions of inter-group conflicts that escalate around the desire of
young Hutu and Tutsi to intermarry.
These narratives relate to the desire for reciprocal valorisation, as “marriage symbolizes the peak
of social acceptance, not only between individuals, but also between groups” (Rwandan
interviewee, Dahlmanns 27.04.2009). They likewise point at the aspiration for a dissolution of
social boundaries and differences into undeniable biological homogeneity and unity, perceived to
be threatened by the cultural law of patrilineal descent. As one Rwandan interviewee explained,
the “question is wrought with a contradiction ‒ we cannot be a nation while still being separate.
Marriage is not the only answer, we are all of mixed blood but this is about patrilineal dynasties”
(Rwandan interviewee, Dahlmanns 2017: 183). This means that intermarriage does not eliminate
the ethnicized labelling through which the social identity of the father alone is conventionally
passed on to the children, e.g. either Hutu or Tutsi. At a government-run solidarity camp
(Ingando), one participant staged a performance in which he poured water from different buckets
into one to illustrate biological 'mixing' through intermarriage throughout history, and to
symbolise the irrationality of social division as well as the idea of homogeneity and unity through
an awareness of kinship and common descent. Stories of Hutu-Tutsi intermarriage that address
conflict resolution between the families of perpetrators and survivors of the genocide often echo
the government's narrative of unity and reconciliation, and also refer to foundational myths of
descent. For example, the dance theatre piece 'The Unity of Gihanga's Children' (2009), performed
by prison inmates on the subject of national unity and reconciliation, alludes to a connection
18 Under King Kigeri Rwabugiri (1835-1895), a special company (Itorero) was first established, specializing in artistic
performances (Nkulikiyinka 2002: 173 ff). This likely marked the beginning of professionalization in the artistic
representation of Rwanda through the war dances of the Intore. At the very least, the performances of the newly
established Royal Ballet maintained their importance for representing the nation (Nkulikiyinka 2002: 173-179, 205).
However, the traditional Itorero institution gradually lost its significance with the introduction of mission schools
during the colonial era.
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between the motif of intermarriage and the mythical idea of the restoration of an original, descent-
based bond, and likewise refers to the fulfilment of the government's unity policy. (Dahlmanns
2017: 168-221)
5.1 Main Attributes: Exclusion and Integration
In Rwanda, kinship imaginaries illustrate the idea of social cohesion through genuine
interconnectedness. Throughout history, they have essentialized social ties on the one hand, but
also legitimized social boundaries and inequalities on the other. The idea of intermarriage is
linked to the transgression and dissolution of defined group demarcations and the desire for
mutual acceptance, valorisation and enhancement. Kinship imageries of cohesion in Rwanda are
two-dimensional: in their exclusive interpretation they legitimise social boundaries and
inequalities, and in their integrative interpretation they dissolve boundaries and inequalities
through the uniting principle of descent. They aim at creating irreversible evidence of unity, not
only implying social proximity and interrelation, but irresolvable biological synthesis, too.
Although kinship narratives often address the close relationships between individuals and
families within a neighbourhood, they also refer to and reflect a political and wider social
dimension, in particular the impact of ideologies of social inequality and persistent stereotypes
about inter-group relations. Kinship narratives, which have been central to the legitimation of
political orders since pre-colonial times, have taken on new forms to support or oppose the power
constellations and social conditions of their time. Typically, they have sought to legitimise and
validate a socio-political order through the idea of irreversible descent. (Dahlmanns 2017: 169-
221) (→ Table 2)
5.2 Spatial and Temporal Scope: Changing Visions of Origin and Types of Cohesion
Although early foundational myths of the kingdom had affirmed a fraternal bond of Hutu, Tutsi
and Twa based on the idea of descent from the same forefather Gihanga, they also constituted
differences, the persistence of which narratives promoted by proclaiming that Hutu, Tutsi and
Twa were to marry one of their own kind (see Dahlmanns 2017: 177-178). These narratives
reaffirmed endogamous marriage rules and the convention of patrilineal identity transmission (of
the father's identity category to the children in the case of intermarriage) in line with the political
order to maintain the construction of group boundaries along the Hutu-Tutsi demarcation with
its associated disadvantages and privileges. (See e.g. Mensching 1987: 28-29; Czekanowski 1917:
242; Maquet 1961) But as independence loomed, these were challenged by a revolutionary
interpretation of intermarriage that promoted a new egalitarian vision of national identity that
questioned the unequal social order.
At the dawn of independence, a new vision of cohesion and an egalitarian Rwandan national
identity was articulated in the play 'L'Optimiste' by Naigiziki (1958), reflecting the emerging social
critique of the Hutu emancipation movement. The play tells the story of a young Hutu-Tutsi
couple's unbreakable desire to marry against the wishes of their families, eventually forcing the
families to reconcile and overturn the social hierarchy of the kingdom in the micro-cosmos of their
neighbourhood and unite. The play envisions the end of the monarchy and Hutu oppression, and
presents the aspirations of the young generation as a progressive path to an egalitarian and
prosperous future for Rwanda. The protagonists refer to myths of common descent and the
formation of a new overarching identity based on the idea of racial fusion: "The full development
of Rwanda lies above all in the fusion of the races through intermarriage. Let there be neither
Bahutu nor Batutsi, but only and officially Banyarwanda" (translation from French, Naigiziki
28/1958: 31).
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Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda
In post-independence plays, the theme of intermarriage was used to illustrate the success of the
so-called social revolution and thus included references to the national space (see, for example,
"Ibereho Nkindi", Byuma 1972). However, the popularity of the sujet and the fact that government
slogans up to the 1980s still echoed ideas of kinship, claiming that Banyarwanda was the common
surname of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa (de Lame 2005: 98; de Lame 1996: 286), contrasted with the
disapproval and devaluation of mixed marriages and their offspring in the context of divisive
national politics.
In times of crisis, inter-group relations were turned into a political issue and declared a threat to
the national community, culminating in the prohibition of Hutu-Tutsi intermarriage in the 10
Commandments of the Hutu in the extremist magazine Kangura, and the horrific killings of the
genocide, which also targeted the offspring of mixed marriages (Chrétien 1995: 141f). (For more
details on intermarriage in the broader political context, see Dahlmanns, 2017: 168-221) (→
Table 2)
5.3 Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions: The Children and the Father of the Nation
Since pre-colonial times, kinship narratives in Rwanda have functioned as allegories defining
cohesion in relation to Rwandan society as a whole and later to its conception as a 'nation' (suffice
it to say that the etymology of the term 'nation' refers to the idea of cohesion linked to common
descent), using principles of descent and intermarriage to address or emphasise essentialising
ideas of cohesion. The foundational myths of the pre-colonial kingdom legitimised its political
order and a cohesive social hierarchy by linking Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as one people horizontally
and vertically to their king, emphasising common descent from a divine ancestor from whose
heavenly origin the king's authority derived, combined with the belief that the well-being of the
country and its people depended on the well-being of the king (d'Hertefelt 1969; d'Hertefelt and
Coupez 1964). The particular conception of the ruler as a father caring for his 'children' lived on
in a political system centred on authority - the continuity of which Lemarchand reflected by
describing the First Republic as a 'presidential Mwamiship' ('presidential kingdom', Lemarchand
1970: 116, 270-272). This vertical dimension of cohesion illustrated by this particular kinship
imagery is also reflected in political songs, where President Kagame is still praised as a caring
father and a pillar of cohesion in whom his children pledge their trust: "We Rwandan sons and
daughters whom you saved from genocide. We will vote for you, father, who fed his children with
milk and they [were] overfed. Courageous man, commander-in-chief, hero of Rwanda. Always be
on the throne, keep winning and you will be vindicated. You have good plans, the foundation of
unity, reconciliation and development, we won't let you down” (translation from Kinyarwanda,
Dahlmanns 2017: 148). (→Table 2)
6 Rwandan Conceptions of Cohesion
In Rwanda, the government's conception of social cohesion is inextricably linked to its political
strategy of nation-re-building19, on which the stability of the fragile post-genocide political order
was to depend. This conception is subject to the notion of the individual's commitment and
responsibility to the nation and its goals. In Itorero, cohesion and cooperation are to be achieved
through the integration into a national community of the “chosen” (Intore), uplifted and bound
together by a normative image of a national culture, a nativist patriotism, embodied by the Intore
warrior as the symbol of the ideal citizen. The government’s approach to cohesion emphasizes
cooperation for the common good, promoting high levels of compulsory participation. An efficient
system of governance reminiscent of the pre-colonial army, as established with Itorero, ensures
the integration of the population and its cooperation for national development and might favour
19 On the particular ideological strategies of nation-building see also Derichs (2004).
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cohesion: The system operates through the mandatory involvement of each individual, as well as
the control, reward, and sanctioning of performance – promoting a meritocratic order as opposed
to one based on ethnicized affiliations. Nonetheless, the invocations of the mythical forefather
Gihanga may still imply a genealogical and descent-based legitimization of the nation.
Despite the government’s efforts to reduce descent-based ethnic identification by promoting civic
identity, kinship imageries remain central to local political notions of social cohesion. Since pre-
colonial times, kinship narratives have addressed social inequalities and issues of cohesion,
legitimizing and (re)framing socio-political orders through ideas of descent and intermarriage. In
their exclusive interpretation, these narratives have reinforced social boundaries and inequalities.
Conversely, they have sought to affirm essentialized ideas of unity and dissolve divisions through
imageries of an irreversible bond in their integrative interpretation. (→ Table 2)
The new nationalism promoted to foster cohesion is far from exclusive. Integration into the new
national community, however, is not based on the principle of descent, which historically
regulated access to privileges and resources in Rwanda, but rather on the individual's
commitment to a 'moral national culture' and a future vision of the nation.
The government's historical narrative centrally draws on images of cohesion from a pre-colonial
tradition and is remarkably inclusive of central imageries of the opposing previous political order:
It integrates some of the influential slogans of Hutu nationalism referring to the 'revolution', the
fight against 'colonialism' and 'independence', changing their connotations in favour of the
stability of the new order.
However, given that violent conflict has undermined inter-group trust, this does not appear to be
an obstacle to successful mobilisation and cooperation for development. It is noteworthy that the
government, in its Social Cohesion Study, noted with regard to interpersonal trust: “Interpersonal
distrust does not necessarily prevent Rwandans from working together. For example, two-thirds
of respondents agree that high levels of distrust are not an impediment for Rwandans to work
together on community development projects.” (NURC 2008: 2)
Although high levels of cooperation do not necessarily indicate cohesion, cooperation could
ultimately lead to developmental outcomes that could in turn promote cohesion. The Realistic
Group Conflict Theory (Sherif 1966) suggests that the need for cooperation between conflicting
groups to achieve a common goal is likely to decrease inter-group tensions and reduce hostile
perceptions of the other. On the other hand, the same efficient control structure that is supposed
to promote cooperation, as in Itorero, can also serve security interests, creating a security
architecture, as in Uganda (see e.g. Kagoro 2012), that at first glance is at odds with the democratic
orientation the government is seeking to promote.
It could be argued that, in response to a lack of input legitimacy and pervasive inter-group
mistrust affecting both horizontal and vertical dimensions, the government adopts a strategy of
fostering high output legitimacy by enforcing compulsory cooperation for development (see
Ingelaere; Ndayiragije and Verpoorten 2022). Development outcomes that favour the individual
and the nation potentially increase output legitimacy of the government and can also increase
vertical trust. However, striking is the extraordinarily high level of recognition of the
government's efforts among the population, as revealed by the government's Social Cohesion
Survey, which shows that “97%, agree that “the Government is doing its best to improve standards
of living” in the country. This unusually unanimous approval rating for the Government is much
higher than in 47 industrialized and developing countries polled in an international opinion
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Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda
survey in 2007 – only China comes somewhat close to the government approval ratings in Rwanda
with 89%.” (NURC 2008: 2)
Given these high scores and levels of cooperation regardless of trust, one could speculate that the
success of the approach may be due less to trust in (Ger.: Vertrauen in) political institutions and
fellow citizens, but more to the familiarity with (Ger.: Vertrautheit mit) authority-oriented
systems of governance, which have marked a continuity in Rwandan history, and the lack of
alternatives. Nevertheless, the measurability of individual attitudes and perceptions of social
cohesion is clearly limited in a political context where the required strong commitment to a unity
paradigm and the expected sanctions for dissent are likely to produce responses in line.20
The foregoing considerations suggest that the concept of social cohesion in the government
discourse is less focused on the encompassing integration of diversity than on a strong common
normative cultural denominator, the particular cohesive quality of which is based on a universal
nationalist psychology of the enhancement of the individual's self-worth through access to, and
commitment to, a superior national community and its benefits. This approach to cohesion
exemplifies a strong vertical orientation, demanding cooperation for the sake of the nation. It
refers to values such as altruistic, selfless, and heroic service to the nation and reflects an
authority-oriented tendency rooted in a political tradition dating back to pre-colonial times.
Whereas the de-essentialization of identity, facing its multifaceted nature, has been discussed as
a way to avoid exclusion (Wielenga 2014), familiar narratives and symbols of culture and kinship
in Rwanda apparently aim at creating evidence of unity and cultural belonging.
While the psychological dynamic unleashed by the government's approach may be universal, it
centrally seems to derive its force from the popularity of and the familiarity with established
cultural patterns and their normative coding that e. g. the Intore warrior represents, reflecting the
cultural and historical particularities of nationalism that Smith's ethno-symbolic approach has
drawn attention to (Smith 1999). The government's strategy for cohesion and development relies
on the mobilising normative potential of this particular cultural heritage, the appropriation of
which resonates with Jan Assmann's reflection on the formation of collective identity essential to
the stability of social orders: "[t]hrough its cultural heritage a society becomes visible to itself and
to others. Which past is revealed in this heritage and which values emerge in its identificatory
appropriation tells us much about the constitution and tendencies of a society" (translated from
German, Assmann 1995: 133).
It may be worth considering the extent to which the internationalized definition as summarized
by Leininger et al. (2021) may also reflect culture-specific normative tendencies towards
democratic values, focusing on voluntarism, freedom of choice, tolerance of diversity, and trust as
indicators of a particular quality of cohesion, favoured against the backdrop of a European
historical experience that has cultivated scepticism towards nationalist and authority-oriented
tendencies as sources of cohesion. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that post-
genocide nationalism in Rwanda is aimed at bridging social divisions in order to promote cohesion
and stabilize a political order under particularly difficult conditions since the end of civil war and
genocide.
The foregoing analysis has shown that Rwandan notions of social cohesion revolve around
'culture' and 'kinship,' which throughout history have played a crucial role in (re)framing social
orders in response to inter-group conflict and shifting conceptions of the nation. This case study
20 The Government prohibited the spread of divisionism by law (2002), criticized for its vague definition and potential
to crush opposition.
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suggests that beyond trust in institutions and fellow citizens, understanding the normative
narratives and cultural frameworks that define social order, as well as the population's familiarity
with these, is crucial to assessing cohesion—especially in contexts of nation-building where social
trust has been eroded by violent conflict. (→ Table 3)
Against the backdrop of a global political trend to re-discover the potentials of local traditions that
have long been neglected due to the ethnocentric perspectives of 'Western' research (Mac Ginty
and Richmond 2013; Richmond 2005; Naucke and Bräuchler 2017), it is noteworthy that the local
political reasons for the return to traditions vary. In Rwanda, they are at the core of a large-scale
nationalist social project with implications for the particular quality and measurement of social
cohesion on the ground. In this context, it might be worth considering whether approaches to or
conceptions of cohesion that at first glance appear to deviate from globalized ideas of democratic
orientations might nevertheless — in different social and political contexts — unfold potentials
that hold society together.
16
Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda
7 Tables: Central Attributes of Rwandan Concepts of Social Cohesion
Table 1: Concept 1 of social cohesion: main attributes, dimensions and scope.
[Concept 1] Culture as Cohesion: National value orientations the Intore warrior represents
Di
i
Attribute 1
Heroism,
patriotism,
superiority &
chosenness,
loyalty & integrity,
pride
Attribute 2
Performance
orientation & ultimate
commitment to
national goals, ”selfless
service to the nation”,
altruism,
excellency, discipline,
obedience, conformity
Attribute 3
Unity & brotherhood,
esprit de corps among
“Intore” based on
shared culture/values
and vision/mission.
Nobility: dignity,
peacefulness, morality,
caring & empathic
attitude
Spatial
Temporal
H
i
l
Cohesion based on
the principles of
military
culture/corps
ethnos & a shared
mission.
Shared sense of
cultural ties,
attachment to one
homeland &
interdependency of
compatriots/com-
batants, united as
superior, “chosen”
people.
Shared sense of ultimate
commitment to national
goals.
Integration based on
common values,
meritocratic vs. descent
based orientation of the
community.
Strength through unity.
Sense of responsibility
towards
compatriots/”comba-
tants”, united by
morality.
Shared high sense of
national, social duty &
awareness of ultimate
need to contribute to the
common good.
Nation
Structures of the Itorero program
reproduce troop formations of the
pre-colonial army and refer to its
culture & value orientation.
The pre-colonial army was central
to the formation of the pre-colonial
kingdom´s state-structures
integrating the population,
promoting cultural homogenization
& authority-oriented militarized
culture.
The culture of cohesion promoted
also relates to RPF-army ethnos
and unity policy of post-
independence one-party states.
V
i
l
Shared sense of
superiority and
election for higher
tasks based on
national affiliation.
Sense of duty to the
nation.
Compliance with
government policy
requirements/
authority/national
values.
Moral commitment to
nation/authority.
Nation
See above
17
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (LVII)
Table 2: Concept 2 of social cohesion: main attributes, dimensions and scope
[Concept 2] Kinship as Cohesion: Imageries of intermarriage and common descent
Dimension
Attribute 1
Reciprocal
valorisation &
acceptance
Attribute 2
Interconnectednes,
social proximity,
dissolution &
re-definition of
social boundaries
Attribute 3
Evidence of
irreversible unity,
essentialisation of
bonding &
boundaries,
inclusive national
identity
Spatial
Temporal
Horizontal
Between Hutu & Tutsi
Between Hutu &
Tutsi, bi-directional
function: legitimizing
boundaries/inequa-
lity (exclusion) &
dissolving
boundaries/inequa-
lity (integration)
through principles of
descent and
intermarriage.
Fusion of Hutu &
Tutsi ꓿ creating
genuine unity and
Rwandicity/Rwan-
dan national identity
Inter-personal
relations intertwined
with inter-group
relations, referring to
national cohesion of
Rwandans.
Foundational myths of
common descent of the pre-
colonial kingdom defined a
cohesive hierarchy of Hutu,
Tutsi, Twa, legitimizing the
unequal social order of the
time & political hierarchy of
the kingdom.
Counter narratives of
intermarriage promoting an
egalitarian conception of
cohesion & national identity
emerged with the Hutu
emancipation movement
1958.
Vertical
Dissolution of social
hierarchy, definition
of an egalitarian
social order &
inclusive national
identity
Reconfiguring
social/political
hierarchies.
Relation between
head of state as a
caring and guiding
“father” of the nation
with Rwandans as
“children” of Rwanda.
Legitimizing or
verifying a social and
political order
through descent.
The national
community of
Rwandans
See above
18
Social Cohesion in Post-Genocide Rwanda
Table 3: Comparative assessment of concepts of social cohesion: New insights from Africa
[Concept 1]
Dimension/
Attributes
Commonality1
Difference2
Contribution to innovation of
mainstream
Horizontal
Identity
x
Based on normative
imageries of a shared,
superior, performance-
oriented culture.
Imageries of kinship
(descent &
intermarriage) creating
inclusiveness by
dissolving group
boundaries,
symbolizing reciprocal
valorization, trust,
essentialized evidence
of cohesion/unity.
Local narratives and symbols aim at
creating evidence of unity and
cultural belonging & draw on and
integrate familiar patterns of a
cultural/collective heritage with
normative implications.
→ Central importance of traditional
patterns for creating cohesion &
legitimizing social/political orders.
→ Essentialization of inclusive
identity.
Trust
x
Inter-group trust as well
as trust in government
institutions is mentioned
as a factor of social
cohesion, but found to be
of minor importance
for cooperation.
While inter-group trust is perceived to
be of minor significance for
cooperation, the familiarity with
(“Vertrautheit mit” vs. “Vertrauen in”)
authority-oriented systems of
governance as a cultural political
tradition and lack of alternatives might
support high levels of cooperation.
“Trust” in out-put efficiency of the
government, based on high levels of
mandatory participation.
Cooperation for
common good
x
Mandatory
cooperation
for a higher purpose / to
the benefit of the nation &
lack of alternatives.
See above
Vertical
Identity
x
See above →Traditional
symbols & practices
integrate and
compensate
discrepancies
threatening cohesion and
are a source of
values/norms.
The significance of the particular
appropriation and use of cultural
heritage for creating cohesion and
legitimizing social/political orders.
Trust
x
Demonstration of
ultimate loyalty and
commitment → “culture
of praise” staging trust in
the authority and its
mission.
Familiarity with (Vertautheit mit) the
functioning of authority-oriented
culture and systems of governance.
“Trust” in the efficiency of the system.
Cooperation for
common good
x
Compliance with
authority, indicating
overlapping individual
and “national” interests.
Based on the traditional normative
idea of compliance to authority/its
higher mission. Mandatory
cooperation & lack of alternatives,
high outcome expectation & rewards
as preconditions for successful
cooperation.
19
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (LVII)
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University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (LVII)
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