Ọ̀rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy : An African Philosophy through Cinematic Storytelling
Abstract
- Abstract
- en This paper develops a film-philosophy, (which I call “Ọ̀rúnmìliàn film-philosophy”), by exploring and analyzing the praxis of Ọ̀rúnmìlà oral philosophy and narrative aesthetics in an African cinematic storytelling. It defends a modest thesis by using Saworoide (dir. Túndé Kèlání’s, 1999) as an example of how the African/Nigerian filmmakers are influenced by their inherited oral philosophical traditions. It argues that the condition of philosophy that gives “presence to non-presence” (so that the living can dialogue with the dead) and “knowledge to the unknown” (in order to heal and to re-moralize the living) is central to the Ọ̀rúnmìliàn film-philosophy. The central argument is based on what I call the Ọ̀rúnmìlà “parable of Eégún” (masquerade); and the film-philosophy finds some philosophical similarities in Stanley Cavell’s The World Viewed on the one hand, and Christopher Falzon’s concept of cinema as philosophy, (which is based on Plato’s parable of the cave), on the other. The paper therefore stresses the intercultural correlation between an African film-Philosophy and the modern European/western traditions of film-philosophy. It contributes to film and philosophy scholarship by exploring the manifestations of Yorùbá/Ọ̀rúnmìlà philosophical texts in the contemporary Nigerian film as case study of how contemporary African filmmakers, like their oral artiste counterparts, continue to articulate their inherited traditions via cinematic storytelling.
Description
- Full text
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35
University of Bayreuth
African Studies
WORKING PAPERS
Ọ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy
An African Philosophy through
Cinematic Storytelling
Bello, Saheed Adesumbo, 2023
academy reflects 9
35
University of Bayreuth
African Studies
WORKING PAPERS
Ọ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy
An
African
Philosophy
through
Cinematic
Storytelling
CC-BY-NC 4.0
Bello, Saheed Adesumbo, 2023
Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy
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University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (XXXV)
About the Author
Saheed Adesumbo Bello currently undertakes a pioneering work that he calls “the New Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà
project” titled: “The Reclaim of Reason: Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà, Orality, Skepticism and Morality”, at the
Department of Philosophy, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands. He taught theatre and film
theories as well as theatre design and technology at the Department of Creative Arts, University
of Lagos, Nigeria. Saheed was an International Fellow at the Bayreuth Academy of Advanced
African Studies, University of Bayreuth from February 1, 2021 to July 31, 2021. His research
focuses on African philosophy, intercultural philosophy, Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà oral philosophy, film and
philosophy, religion and literature as well as literature and film. He holds a PhD from the
Department of Creative Arts, University of Lagos with a designated emphasis on literature and
film. His publications include: “Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà Epistemic Reproduction: Nigerian Film Philosophy via
Divinity and Ọrality,” Black Camera: An International Film Journal 13, no. 2 (Spring 2022); ‘Se “Iya”
Ni’wo yi?: Questioning Motherhood in Bosede Ademilua-Afolayan’s Drama,’ in Nigerian Female
Dramatists: Expression, Resistance, Agency, edited by Bosede Funke Afolayan, Routledge: Taylor &
Francis, 2021; ‘‘Scenodecography’: The Praxis of Light-Tech-Driven Design in MTN project Fame’
published in Dramatized Media, etum, 2015; and ‘The Pirate of Nollywood’ published in Theatre,
Media, and Cultural Re-engineering in Nigeria: an ovation of excellence to Barclays Foubiri
Ayakoroma, Kraft Book, 2017.
vi
Introduction
Contents
Institute of African Studies (IAS)
iii
Academy reflects
iv
About the Author
v
Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy
An African Philosophy through Cinematic Storytelling
1 Introduction
1
2 The Concept of Film as Philosophy
2
3 What is Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy?
4
4 Conclusion
13
5 References
14
6 Latest Publications in the Academy Reflects Working Paper Series
17
Ọ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy
An
African
Philosophy
through
Cinematic
Storytelling
Dr Saheed Adesumbo Bello1
1 Introduction
The ongoing discussion on the relationship between film and philosophy has been dominated by
European/Western philosophers who have explored the manifestations of specific
European/Western philosophical traditions in Hollywood narrative film, European Art film and
non-African experimental films; I shall join the discussion and analyse some films that articulate
Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà, an African oral philosophy. This is important as I doubt that Africa is not once again left
off the global discourse of philosophical concern. While I am not saying that the foremost
philosophers who predominantly –and not interested in African films – doubt that African films
can philosophize, I doubt that these philosophers of film have not inherited the Eurocentric bias
championed by David Hume and Immanuel Kant that Africans and their descendants are
intellectually incapable of philosophical reasoning. Against the Eurocentric notion, there are
objections raised by the voices and works of some of the foremost Africanist and ideological
philosophers, both oral and professional: Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy (1969); Henry Odera
Ọruka’s “Sage Philosophy” (1998); Sophie Olúwọlé’s Socrates and Òrúnmìlà (2017); Paulin
Hountondji African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (1983;1990); Kwasi Wiredu Philosophy and
African Culture (1980); Abiodun Bodunrin “The Question of African Philosophy” (1984); and the
new crops of professional philosophers who engaged in the emerging counter-critique of the
critique of ethno-philosophy. However, my skepticism is based on the idea that the Eurocentric
stereotype served as the springboard to the “way that pre-colonial knowledge, [of Africa], has
been set aside, marginalized, deprived of its internal dynamism and power of self-regeneration
and self-criticism, prevented from absorbing, assimilating, and freely developing contributions
from outside for its own benefit” (Hountondji 1990: 27). It is also based on the structure of
hierarchy that rated Africa third world globally – the concept of rating what Jonathan Haynes and
Ivo Ritzer call “third worldism” – as well as the epistemic politics through which the inherited oral
1 I am grateful to the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence at the University of Bayreuth (funded by the
German Research Foundation under Germany’s Excellence Strategy – EXC 2052/1 – 390713894).
2
The Concept of Film as Philosophy
thoughts of the people are conceived as primitive and non-philosophical (Haynes 2010; Ritzer
2018).
Inasmuch as the Eurocentric bias, according to Barry Hallen, “had profound consequences for
Africa’s status vis-à-vis philosophy as an international enterprise [as] Africa’s indigenous cultures
were, in both principle and fact, disqualified from occupying a place in the philosophical arena”
(Hallen 2002: 4). Is it not doubtful that Africans are once again considered too inept to
philosophize through films? Though it has been proved beyond a doubt that philosophies are
embedded in inherited oral philosophical texts of the people; the inauguration of African
philosophy as an academic enterprise was a recent development that began as a reaction against
the false ahistorical conception of Africa/ns by the non-African philosophers. And it is evident that
the interdisciplinary debates on films as philosophy emerged while African philosophers are still
struggling to take African philosophy to the center of the international philosophical arena.
Adeshina Afolayan affirms that by declaring that “African philosophy, since its inauguration, has
refused to engage African cinema” (Afolayan 2017: 525).
Meanwhile, specific explorations of the relationship between African films and philosophies have
been engaged by some scholars of contemporary African cinema. For instance, Kenneth Harrow
embraces the problem of trash – which is synonymous with African cinema – not solely as the
problem of value between the so-called more and lesser cultures, but also as the condition of
philosophy that is rooted in the trashiness of artistic recycling of ideas. Ritzer conceives “Post-
Third Cinema” that finds a theoretical frame in the philosophy of relationality (Ritzer 2018).
Adesina Afolayan grounds his reading of African cinema “on Deleuzian experience: Can the
compelling significance of the African predicament force African philosophers to look for answers,
and even questions, in Nollywood?” (Afolayan 2017: 525). But here, I am exploring how
African/Yorùbá films can articulate original and innovative philosophical concepts.
2 The Concept of Film as Philosophy
The process of articulating, refining and prolonging philosophical tradition is what Stephen
Mulhall clarifies as the very idea of film as philosophy (Mulhall 2007). This is conceived by
philosophers who claim that films can articulate or illustrate pre-existing philosophical concepts
in innovative ways. In doing so, he distinguishes and relates three ideas of film as philosophy: film
as philosophizing, the philosophy of film, and film in the condition of philosophy. He describes film
as philosophy by stressing the philosophy of film as the most familiar and central idea that allows
film to attain “the philosophical citadel: the activity it refers to is constructed on the model of
'philosophy of history', 'philosophy of science', 'philosophy of religion', and so on.” (Mulhall 2007:
280). In other words, the model of philosophy or philosophy in its essential parasitic mode,
according to Mulhall, permits film to raise reflective questions about basic resources and
grounding assumptions or conceptual presuppositions. Mulhall’s concept of film as philosophy is
inspired by film that inherits a specific narrative universe, film nature, characters, thematic
contents, and other basic resources that are questioned as to the conditions of its own possibility.
Substantiating his points, he focuses on critical analysis of films that actively question their own
conditions of possibility by drawing examples from “common generation of sequels and series in
contemporary Hollywood as one way in which film attains the condition of modernism (in which
its own history becomes an unavoidable problem), and thereby the condition of philosophy.”
(Mulhall 2007: 183). He therefore claims that the condition of philosophy is discovered by Stanley
Cavell.
Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy
3
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (XXXV)
Of all the philosophers that conceive narrative films as articulations and/or prolongations of pre-
existing philosophical traditions, Stanley Cavell is perhaps the central figure. His work The World
Viewed (1971) establishes that the condition of philosophy for Hollywood fiction films is the
condition of viewing a past world. “In this, movies resemble novels, a fact mirrored in the sound
of narration itself, whose tense is the past”, (Cavell 1971: 308). Though Cavell claims that he tries
to keep Wittgenstein and Heidegger from overlaying what he had in mind to say about film, it is
evident that his conception of film as a projected world is not dissimilar to human ways of viewing
the absent and past world as conceived, though in different ways, by these philosophers. But what
Cavell conceives as projected reality allows actors, who have been captured and projected onto
the screen as characters, to sit next to their audience in the cinema. The projected reality can be
described in Derridian terms as the movement of “the ghosts who parade past” (De Baecque et al.
2015: 30). Or is there any way to describe the movement of characters that occurs in two different
worlds simultaneously other than to say that one is real while the other is unreal?
The projection of unreal/past characters to real/present spectators is one of the conditions of
philosophy that allows the past to dialogue with the present in the Cavellian sense. The condition
of philosophy lends credence to Derrida’s claim that “hypnosis, fascination, identification, all these
terms and procedures are common to film and to psychoanalysis, and this is a sign of a “thinking
together” that foregrounds (De Baecque et al. 2015: 26), (in Mulhall’s words), “the relation
between reason, emotion and imagination in aesthetics and ethics, and in philosophical discourse
more generally.” (De Baecque et al. 2015: 27). The condition of philosophy does not solely push
the problem of interactions between the past/unreal and the present/real into cinematic context
but also finds resemblance in Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn film-philosophy that will be discussed in the next
section.
Following Cavell’s lead, Martin Woessner explores how one of Cavell’s philosophy students at
Harvard, – Terrence Malick deploys his films, such as, Badlands (1973), Days of Heaven (1978),
and The Thin Red Line (1998) among others, to “push [Heidegger’s] philosophy into new contexts”
(Woessner 2011: 132). Similarly, Nicholas Diehl uses Christopher Nolan’s three films, Memento
(2000), The Prestige (2006), and Inception (2010) and draws philosophical methods from
Socrates elenchus to show parallels between the properties and possibilities of narrative film and
those of Socratic dialogue (Diehl 2016). But while the projection of unreal/past characters to
real/present spectators is central to Cavell’s film-philosophical project; Christopher Falzon
deploys Plato’s cave to discuss modern cinema, (a place/space where spectators can see a
projected world), as a metaphor for the modern world where humans are held captive by what
Cavell describes as mechanically projected realities.
Christopher Falzon’s book Philosophy Goes to the Movies: An Introduction to Philosophy describes
film as an illumination of philosophical positions as he counters prejudice against the visual image
as an avenue to philosophical enlightenment. Falzon argues that philosophers, like Plato in his
myth of the cave, have always resorted to the use of vivid images as metaphors to clarify their
philosophical positions. While he is unable to defend his claim by using visual images in films, he
points to “the very structure of modern cinema [as] reminiscent of Plato’s cave.” (Falzon 2002: 4).
He describes the structure (arrangement) of the modern cinema as a darkened enclosed space
where the movie-goers seem like Plato’s captives. But the very structure of modern cinema as a
space where the art of the cinema (i.e. projected world) is viewed by spectators is not the same
thing as the film itself. Though Falzon argues that Bernardo Bertolucci’s film The Conformist
(1970) uses “Plato’s cave image quite deliberately and explicitly in the film to comment on the
imprisoning delusions of fascism” (Falzon 2002: 24); but his argument is not clearly worked out
4
What is Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy?
as he is unable to elaborate how films are used to illustrate the concept of fascism. Perhaps that
would explain why Thomas Wartenberg comes to his rescue by analyzing how Charles Chaplin’s
film Modern Times (1936) uses Plato’s cave-like images to illustrate Karl Marx’s theory of
alienation (Wartenberg 2006). Though Wartenberg claims that film can philosophize beyond
mere illustration, he ends up exploring how the film provides us with a specific interpretation of
the mechanization of human beings that Marx attributes to capitalism.
Despite Falzon’s shortcomings, his translation of Plato’s cave to the structure of modern cinema
links his philosophical concept to what Cavell conceives as projected reality. While Falzon’s
analogy of the myth dwells more on the structure of modern cinema as the metaphor of the
modern world, the structure gives support to modern cinematic storytelling described as ‘the
mechanical projection of reality’ in Cavellian terms. Arguably, the concept of mechanical
projection of reality is influenced by Wittgenstein’s remark that “a picture held us captive. And we
could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us
inexorably” (Wittgenstein 1999: § 115). Insofar as Cavellian film’s as philosophy actively
questions their own conditions of possibility, (i.e., the conditions of modernism), one can say that
a picture that held us captive, according to Wittgenstein, is deeply rooted in the restricted
conditions of being modern. With the conditions of being modern, and the use of the media of
storytelling for colonial conquest emerged what Ali Mazrui’s conceives as A Triple Heritage
(Mazrui 1986) that threw Africa(ns) into what Bruno Latour describes as “the conflicts of values
in which the moderns, [like Africans], have found themselves entangled.” (Latour 2013: 53).
But while it may sound paradoxical, there is a Yorùbá saying that a person who is hit by a vehicle
would be carried to the hospital for healing by using a vehicle. Insofar as it is possible to hypnotize,
manipulate and colonize the human mind and knowledge production by using the media of
narration/storytelling; then, it is also possible to decolonize western knowledge of, and about
Africa(ns), as well as to heal Africa(ns) by using the same media of storytelling. For this reason,
African filmmakers, (inspired by notable African poets, dramatists, and novelists, such as, Aime
Cesaire, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Wole Soyinka, Chinua Achebe, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, Femi Ọsofisan
and countless others), deployed their inherited oral philosophical traditions, such as Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà
oral philosophy, as a way of resisting colonization and for healing/decolonizing Africa(ns).
3 What is Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy?
‘Asọ funfun ní sunkún aró, ìpìnlẹ ̀ ọ ̀rọ ̀ ní sunkún èkejì rẹẹ ̀ tantantan’ – it is the
white cloth that cries for specific dyes; the opening of a metaphor begs for its
(Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà oral text of Òtú(r)á Méjì in Túndé Kèlání’s film Saworoidẹ 1999).
Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà is the foremost Yorùbá diviner/philosopher/narrator whose oral corpus radicalized the
Ifá knowledge system. Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà and Ifá are often used interchangeablye. But one can think of
Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà as the progenitor of the Ifá knowledge system, and Ifá as the divination tool as well as
the encyclopedia of the Yorùbá knowledge system. Wande Abimbola explains that “Ifá is
recognized by the Yorùbá as a repository for [the] Yorùbá [indigenous] body of knowledge
embracing history, philosophy, medicine and folklore.” (Abimbola 1975: 32). In Ifá corpus is the
knowledge of Yorùbá societies, historical events, philosophical ideas, and mythical characters that
continue to inspire Yorùbá arts and artists from the ancient to the contemporary times. Bello
asserts that “in the same way the myths of the archetypal gods and heroes have always provided
referential dimensions in Ifá divination, their natures, (which are both divine and human), have
also provided limitless but complex narrative materials for the Yorùbá/Nigerian/African
cineastes and directors.” (Bello 2022: 56). That would explain one of the key reasons why Stanley
Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy
5
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (XXXV)
Cavell finds “the mythical in the typical . . . to be the natural mode of revelation for film . . . the
power with which the director, in his pact with his audience, begins.” (Cavell 1974: 585).
Arguably, the Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn natural mode of revelation for film and/or cinematic experience is, first
and foremost, based on the re/creations of what I call symbolic reality. For this reason, it strikes
me while exploring Falzon’s analogy of Plato’s cave that there is a major distinction between
projected reality and symbolic reality; and that distinction reveals the point of departure between
western film-philosophy, (as conceived by Cavell and Falzon) and African cinematic storytelling –
‘the Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà/Yoruba film-philosophy’. But to clarify my understanding of symbolic reality; let us
analyze Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà’s parable of Eégún (Masquerade) in which the philosophy of art as well as
unrestricted epistemic production and dissemination via African cinematic storytelling can be
understood. In his oral text of Èjì Ogbè, Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà narrates:
Ní ọjo ́ tí Eégún dé ayé, ìbejì ni wo ́n bí i. Ọ ̀ kán ku, Ọ ̀ kán wà láàyè. èyí tí ò wà láàyè wáá
sunkún títí, Ni wo ́n bá do ́gbán, Wo ́n d’ásọ Eégún. Wo ́n mú èyí tó wà láàyè lọ sínú igbó.
Wo ́n gbé asọ Eégún náà bo ́ ẹnìkan lórí. Ẹni tí ó gbé Eégún náà ń pé èyí tó wà lááyé pé:
Má tìí wàá o, ìhín ò ro ̀ o o.’ Èyí tó wà lááyé be ̀re ̀ síí sunkún, Eégún náà yára wọ inú igbó
lo. Asọ tí a dá bò alààyè lóri Ni à ń pè ní e ̀kú Eégún. E ̀kú ayé ò, E ̀kú o ̀run, Ni à ń pè ní
èjìgbèdè e ̀kú2 –
Translation: When masquerades are born, they are born twins. One dies while the
other lives. The living cries endlessly to the extent that the people have to device a
means to stop him. For this reason, they make a masquerade costume; they take the
living to a forest; and they cover someone else with the masquerade costume. The
wearer of the masquerade costume disguises like the dead and says to his twin
brother who lives that: do not come yet, there is no comfort here. The living starts
crying again, the masquerade therefore enters the bush.
Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà reminds us that the cloth which is used in covering the living is what we call
‘masquerade costume’. The costume of the living, the costume of the past/dead/spirit is what we
call Èjìgbèdè E ̀kú. Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà conceives masquerade costume as Èjìgbèdè E ̀kú because it is made to
embody both the metaphysical/mythological language of the dead/spirit and the
everyday/oral/verbal language of the living. On the one hand, Èjìgbèdè E ̀kú is made of symbolic
elements/objects (such as ancestral clothes, dead animal skins, horns, bones, and other dead
objects), to unlock memories of the past and/or dead ancestors. These elements/objects embody
metaphysical/mythological language because it is believed that masquerades are Yorùbá
ancestors who entertain, and celebrate with, their peoples during the annual festival of Egúngún.
That would explain why masquerades are called ará ọ ̀rún – those who come from the world of the
dead/spirit. On the other hand, Èjìgbèdè E ̀kú is made of material objects (such as everyday clothes,
shoes, bags, and other objects that are in vogue), that speak contemporary language in a
metaphorical
manner.
For
this
reason,
Èjìgbèdè
E ̀kú
embodies
both
the
metaphysical/mythological objects of the dead/past and the material objects of the living; and
thus bridges the transitional gulf between the world of the dead and the world of the living. It is
brought alive when used to cover an actor/performer who impersonates a Yorùbá
ancestor/character; and thus speaks oral/verbal language of the living to spectators during the
performance. Having explained what Èjìgbèdè E ̀kú symbolizes, let us turn to the analysis of the
first part of the parable.
2 Abimbola, Wande: Awon Oju Odu Mereerindinlogun, 1977, Oxford University Press, p. 2.
6
What is Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy?
To start with, the twins; (i.e., the masquerades), in the Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà parable stand for a character and
a spectator that is needed for a theatrical or cinematic storytelling to be engaged, or ‘born’ in
Ọ ̀ rúnmìlàn terms. The dead/past and the living inhabit two different worlds, namely, the
theatrical/cinematic narrative world and the world of the audience or the world of the living. Now,
let us imagine how a person who is longing for a dead/past partner/ancestor would feel when
that person is presented with the possibility of meeting such a partner again. The longing for the
dead which prompts the crying of the living can be understood within the context of attachment
(or emotional bond), one of the terms that are common to both narrative artworks and
psychoanalysis, (which is explained later); and the plan to stop the crying of the living is
considered to be the process of theatre-making or film-making in which: masquerade costume is
made; an actor who impersonates the dead is cast; and the performance space, where it deems
possible for the living and the dead to meet and converse, is found in a forest. Hence, the idea of
meeting and having a conversation with the dead (or the past) that appears to us from an
unknown world can be understood as the basis of the sense of intimacy between performer and
audience in the Yorùbá theatre and cinema. Such a performer-audience interaction/relationship
gives credence to the therapeutic nature of Yorùbá/African theatrical or cinematic experience;
and that therapeutic nature of the narrative artworks supports Derrida’s claim that “hypnosis,
fascination, identification are terms and procedures that are common to film and to
psychoanalysis.” (De Baecque et al. 2015: 26). But if the structure of Plato’s cave can be translated
into the structure of modern cinema; the unrestricted natural world (i.e., the forest), in Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà’s
parable of Eégún affirms that Yorùbá/African cinematic storytelling favours any found
space/environment that enlivens therapeutic storytelling.
Unlike Plato’s myth of the cave where people were held captive and deceived by viewing the
dangling shadows of puppets on the wall of the cave, the therapeutic nature of Yorùbá narrative
artworks is demonstrated by the actor, in the Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà myth of Eégún, who wears the
masquerade costume to disguise like the dead or past ancestor; and says to his living twin brother
“do not come yet, there is no comfort here”. Conversely, the dangling characters/objects in Plato’s
cave are mere puppets that cannot talk. It therefore strikes me again that Plato’s parable is
relevant within the context of the western classical silent era from where the examples of silent
cinemas can be drawn; and the Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà parable of Eégún does not solely establish the influence
of visual and oral-aural symbolism of Egúngún on both Yorùbá/African theatre and then cinema,
but also give credence to why the silent era was not recorded in the history of Yorùbá cinema. The
parable affirms the evolutionary theory of foremost Yorùbá theatre scholars, such as, Joel Adedeji
and Biodun Jeyifo that traced the origin of Yorùbá theatre, (which later influenced narrative
aesthetics in Yorùbá cinema), to the celebration of the dead who are reunited with the living
during the annual festival of Egúngún (Adedeji 1998; Jeyifo 1984).
However, the possibility of meeting and having a conversation with the past, which is not without
problems of a certain sort, is the condition of philosophy in the conception of the costume of the
living and the costume of the dead/past as èjìgbèdè e ̀kú, that is, the symbolic object in which the
worlds of the dead and that of the living unfathomably and metaphysically commingle. By way of
analogy, èjìgbèdè e ̀kú in the Yorùbá/African theatre and cinema can be understood as the
symbolic apparatus such as costume and/or costume-props that unlock historical and/or past
knowledge, and thus auto-revive audience memory of the past in a symbolic manner. Of course,
èjìgbèdè e ̀kú represents the past that affects, influences, or comments on, the present. In fact,
Stanley Cavell’s assertion, (which re/echoes Bazin’s conception of film as a representation or
reproduction of the past), that films make sense in past tense finds philosophical resemblance in
the symbolism of èjìgbèdè e ̀kú (Cavell 1971). Paradoxical as it may sound, èjìgbèdè e ̀kú obscures
Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy
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University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (XXXV)
the distinction between the past and the present, the known and the unknown, the world of the
living and the world of the dead, the perceiver and the perceived, as well as illusion and reality
that are interwoven within its metaphysical symbolism.
In Túndé Kèlání’s Saworoidẹ, the manifestations of èjìgbèdè e ̀kú are evident in a tripartite
symbolic apparatus, namely, adé idẹ a brass crown; ìlù saworoidẹ a drum with brass jingle bells;
and àdó idẹ a small brass container. These objects represent some anachronistic metaphors
within the context of the cultural, philosophical, and socio-political epoch of Yorùbá. In the ancient
Yorùbá political system, adé idẹ symbolizes the power of a king; ìlù saworoidẹ represents the
voice of the people; and àdó idẹ contains a substance used for the ritual that binds a King to their
ancestors and peoples. So, in the film, the apparatus metaphorically links the past/ancient/pre-
colonial Yorùbá world to the postcolonial Yorùbá world in Nigeria, Benin Republic, Ghana, Cuba,
Brazil, and the United States. Though they stand for power and politics (between Yorùbá kings,
their ancestors, and people), which have been devalued and subdued in the contemporary
political dispensations, their metaphorical and metaphysical meanings are indestructible. Such
indestructibility of meanings, which lingers on in the people’s minds, allows the Yorùbá past to
dialogue with the present in Kelani’s Saworoidẹ. The indestructible meanings may open the
audience’s cognitive portal to epistemic download triggers by identifying symbols as a device for
“thinking together” (in which the known interacts with the unknown as the past affects our
knowledge of the present), in the Yorùbá/African cinema. In fact, the Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà/Yorùbá
consciousness of indestructible philosophic meanings, (in oral writing of Òtú(r)á Méjì as quoted
at the beginning of this section), is re-echoed, and re-affirmed in the opening sequence of the film
– Saworoidẹ.
Tunde Kelani’s Saworoide tells the story of a city-state called Jogbo. The story is allegorical to post-
independence Nigeria where the indigenous socio-political system of the people is obliterated
because of modernity. It is expected of any king of Jogbo to be of service to his people. For this
reason, every Jogbo king is expected to do the coronation ritual that ties a new king to their
ancestors and people. But during his coronation, Lápitẹ (a Jogbo King in the film) refuses to do the
ritual. Considering himself a modern king, Lápitẹ goes for his coronation ritual with a gun with
which he stops the ritual; and then, threatens the initiates not to tell the world that he has not
done the ritual. For this reason, Lápitẹ is considered by the initiates as his own king rather than
the king of the people. Meanwhile, the implication for any king who refuses to do the ritual of
coronation is that another person will be competing for their crown while the king lives. But Lápitẹ
insists that he does not want to be tied to the people of the past.
Lápite ́ represents a leader who thinks of buying big cars and transferring commonwealth to his
foreign bank accounts as the criteria of being modern. To fund his lavish spending, Lápitẹ gives a
free hand to foreign timber merchants to cut trees from the Jogbo forest. The foreign timber
merchants cut trees without replacing them with new ones. They destroy farm products at the
expense of Jogbo farmers. So, while the people unite against Lápitẹ for his business dealing with
foreign timber merchants and for his lavish spending that makes them poor; Lápite ́ seeks the
military support of General Làgàta in the interest of silencing the voice of the people. Of course,
General Làgàta wins the battle for himself as Lápitẹ’s throne is usurped by the General. Thereafter,
Làgàta connives with some chiefs to continue their corrupt business as usual. But in the end, the
people triumph over Làgàta because he is unaware of the pact that binds every Jogbo’s king to the
people. He knows nothing about the pact that represents an unwritten agreement between a king
and his people. That pact that binds every Jogbo’s king to the people is translatable to metaphors;
8
What is Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy?
(of the white cloth that cries for specific dyes; and the beginning trope of a metaphor that cries
vehemently for its second); in the oral text of Òtú(r)á Méjì that opens this section.
It is important to stress that the pact between the king and the people is not without problems of
certain shots which I describe here as the problems of “metaphysical/ethical twoness”. To clarify
that, let us imagine how a red colour applied to a white cloth would alter the appearance of the
cloth while the metaphysical meanings of white and red colours remain indestructible.
Meanwhile, the indestructible metaphysical meanings of colours alter the appearance of objects
they are applied to; and the objects inevitably attract these colours in the same ways that the
knowledge of the present attracts the indestructible knowledge of the past. So, if we think of Lápitẹ
as a white cloth and think of his ancestors and peoples as the various colours that he attracts,
(because of his socio-political responsibilities as a king), then, we will see the
metaphysical/ethical problem of twoness attached to his position. Of course, the metaphysical
meanings of the crown, throne, beads, staff of office and other paraphernalia that symbolize power
and authorities are indestructible but those who occupy such positions of power are destructible.
For this reason, the problems of metaphysical/ethical twoness are inevitable moral and political
disagreements between the king and the people.
The philosophical problem of twoness which is translatable to the indestructible past of the city-
state of Jogbo is in contact with its destructible present in Kelani’s Saworoidẹ; and the contact
between the past and the present is symbolized by adé idẹ, ìlù saworoidẹ, àdó idẹ and those who
inherit the objects. With a storytelling technique that demonstrates how African sages transmit
their inherited knowledge of origins from one generation to another, the dialogue between the
past and the present is aptly illustrated at the beginning of the film. The archetypes of such sages
in Saworoidẹ are: (Bàbá) the progenitor and the king who shares the historical knowledge of Jogbo
and dies at the beginning of the film; and Bàbá Ọ ̀ pálábá (the local griot/narrator) who stays at the
king’s courtyard in order to know about certain mysteries behind the origin of Jogbo. Bàbá and
Bàbá Ọ ̀ pálábá are the narrative agents that tell the story of the pristine Jogbo not solely to other
characters in the film but also to the film spectators.
It follows that a fortiori equates the story within the story, in the film, to the Yoruba/African
“epistemology of looking-back” which is translatable to the process of learning from, or referring
to, the past to avoid the mistakes therein and to allow the unavoidable problems of the past to
peacefully co-exist with that of the present. As the saying goes, tí ọmọdé bá subú, áwo iwájú, bí
àgbà bá subú á wo e ̀yìn wò – when a teenager falls, he/she looks at the front; but when an adult
falls he/she looks at the back. The Yorùbá epistemic method of looking-back finds critical and
cultural similarities in the symbolic image of the Sankofa bird in the philosophy of the Akan people
of Ghana. Katharina Schramm succinctly sums up the philosophy that ‘“the future lies in the past”
or “You need to know your past in order to move forward” - this is how the adinkra - symbol
Sankofa is often interpreted (Schramm 2010: 191).” Hence to the Yorùbá, (like the Akan people),
the Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà philosophical problem of twoness describes the essence of the knowledge of the
past (or yesterday) while addressing the epistemic problem which may protrude beyond the
present (or today) into the future (or tomorrow).
It is based on the ignorance of this epistemic background in the narrative universe of Jogbo that
the past conflicts with the present and the present beckons the uncertain future; because the king
‘Lápite ́ rejects and desecrates the tradition of the land, and destroys the indestructible
metaphysical epoch represented by the metaphors of adé idẹ a brass crown; ìlù saworoidẹ a drum
with brass jingle bells; and àdó idẹ a small brass container. It is not unreasonable to believe that
the symbolic metaphors of the past have indestructible meanings that bind the sacred to the
Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy
9
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (XXXV)
secular; the psychical to the physical; the past to the present; the known to the unknown; the dead
to the living; the king to the people; and the present to the future. For this reason, Lápitẹ meets
his waterloo as the film demonstrates how metaphysical and/or metaphorical meanings haunt
their objects of significations.
But for humans are moved not only by what they identify but also by what they hear from the
identified thing/being; the living, in the Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà parable, start crying again as soon as the
impersonator of the dead insists that there is no comfort in the world of the dead. Such an
appearance of the dead which makes the audience react to the dialogue shares a philosophical
resemblance to what Derrida in Specters of Marx, calls the “visor effect”. Derrida asserts that “since
we do not see the one who sees us, and who makes the law, who delivers the injunction, (which
is, moreover, a contradictory injunction), since we do not see the one who orders “swear”, we
cannot identify it in all certainty, we must fall back on its voice” (Derrida 1993: 7). However, this
aspect of the parable demonstrates how spectators react to the appearance of èjìgbèdè e ̀kú in
cinematic storytelling. This is important to teach us that while èjìgbèdè e ̀kú can make
us/spectators critical of a character, (such as, Lápitẹ the King of Jogbo in Saworoide), it can also
make us/spectators see another character as an object of admiration. The transformation of
Robert Powell in Franco Zeffirelli’s (1977) film Jesus of Nazareth to the character of Jesus; and the
audience’s reception of the character is an example of how èjìgbèdè e ̀kú can make a character an
object of admiration.
But Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà teaches us that the use of èjìgbèdè e ̀kú to transform a character into an object of
admiration must be suspended with the disappearance of the character which is required to
quench the emotional response of the living (the audience) to the appearance of the dead. Perhaps
the fetishization of the costumed physique of Robert Powell as the physical manifestation of the
son of God is the reason why the actor is mistaken for Jesus in Africa and beyond. Despite that the
actor openly declares that he is not Jesus Christ, his costumed images are still hung in most
Christian homes and churches in Africa, Europe and beyond. Meanwhile, Eégún the performer (in
Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn cinematic storytelling), appears to their twin (the spectator) from the unknown world
to entertain, criticize, psychoanalyze, and thus heal/decolonize their twin (the spectator). But in
Zeffirelli’s film, Jesus Christ wants spectators to come to his father in heaven through him. But I
ask: how can we get to his father through him while we still live? So, it is against non-suspension,
the symbolic fetishization of costumed images, and the sustainability of emotional attachment that
one can understand why Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà reminds us by stressing that the cloth that we used in covering
the living is what we call ‘masquerade costume’. One can say that the teaching of Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà warns
us against the unnecessary fetishization of costumed images via tempo-spatial or spatial,
concealment and displacement/replacement of the living (actor) as in the case of Robert Powell.
For this reason, Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà stresses that the essence of èjìgbèdè e ̀kú is in critical tradition via
theatrical/cinematic storytelling for healing/decolonizing the living (the spectators).
Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà proceeds to the second part of the story:
Ní ọjọ ́ kan, ìyá èjí ń wẹ ̀, Eégún sì ń bọ ̀ wá. Eégún gbé asọ ìyá ẹ ̀ lọ. Wọ ́n ní, kí l’ó gbé
ọ l’ásọ lọ? Ó ní àìmọ ̀ ni è. Wọ ́n ní kín ní jẹ ́ àìmọ ̀? Ó ní èkíní ni Eégún, èkejì ni Orò.
Bí èèyàn ò bá mọ ̀ọ ̀ wẹ ̀, ta ni ó gbé asọ ìdí ẹ ̀ lọ? Wọ ́n ní kí wọn ó bi Eégún. Eégún ní
òun ò gbé e. wọ ́n ní kí wọn ó bi Orò. Orò ní òun ò jalè. […] Ifá má jẹ ̀ẹ ́ kí wọn ó gbé
asọ ìdíì mí lọ3.
3 Abimbola, Wande: Awon Oju Odu Mereerindinlogun, 1977, Oxford University Press, p. 2.
10
What is Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy?
Ọne day, the twins’ mother is taking [a] bath while a masquerader appears at
the village square. The masquerader steals his mother’s clothes. People then
ask the woman: what steals your clothes? The unknown, she responds. They
query: what is the unknown? The woman replies: the first one is Eégún, the
second is Orò. Then, they raise the investigative question: if one does not know
how to bathe, who steals their clothes? They interrogate Eégún, Eégún denies
stealing the clothes. They ask Ọrò; Ọrò responds that he doesn’t steal…. Ifá do
not allow the unknown to steal the clothes that cover my nakedness.
In this part of the story, Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà establishes the essence of Egúngún moral plays as the
dramatizations of specific moral attitudes to be corrected in the Yorùbá communities. He draws
our attention to the two ways of understanding the languages of Egúngún moral plays. The first
one is psychological, a private language known to a certain moral agent/character while the
second is a communal or social language understood by other moral agents who interact or relate
with that moral agent/character. Describing the language of our inner knowing, Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà
translates the privacy that associates with bath-taking into the process of getting rid of immoral
behaviour that questions/bothers our conscience. Inasmuch as people bathe privately, then, one
can say that the process of getting rid of moral dirtiness, (that is known only to a moral agent), is
carried out in a private space (such as bathroom) where no one sees our “moral nakedness”. While
people also bathe in the rivers, the consciousness that comes with keeping our privacy is what
matters in this context. But considering unbecoming moral behaviors that are known to other
moral agents as “communal language” of a certain sort; the clothes in the Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà story can be
described as the symbolic objects that may put a moral agent behind what John Rawls calls “the
veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1999). It is important to clarify that behind “the veil of ignorance” a
moral agent knows nothing about their moral attitudes. So, the clothes ought to be removed before
engaging in the core process of dealing with unbecoming moral attitudes that are not known to a
specific moral agent.
But to remove the clothes in a public space is to expose our “moral nakedness” to ourselves and
to others. To allow such clothes to be stolen and thus be used by others/performers as costumes
and/or costume props is to provide others with èjìgbèdè e ̀kú that may aid their interpretation and
exposition of our moral nakedness. Though it may seem impossible for the performers of moral
plays to expose the moral nakedness of other moral agents based on their deployments of
symbolic apparatus such as èjìgbèdè e ̀kú, it is not impossible for a moral agent who is also a
theatre or cinematic audience to identify a character that looks like their double. Isn’t it natural
and practical that such a moral agent would feel bothered or even troubled that their moral
nakedness has been exposed? It is based on the natural and practical reasons that the Yorùbá
people use the metaphor of o ̀pa (stick) and pe ̀te ̀pe ́te ̀ (mud) to describe “moral narrative” as the
spatter of mud that covers other people’s bodies when one hits the pe ̀te ̀pe ́te ̀ with a o ̀pa. The
Yorùbá saying, therefore, pleads with those who may be covered with the spatter of mud not to
be offended but to yield to corrections. As the saying goes, “[P]ẹ ̀tẹ ̀pẹ ́tẹ ̀ táa nà ní ọ ̀pa; ẹni tó bá tabà
kó má fi se ìbínú, kó bá wa tún‘bẹ ̀ se”. Hence, it is evident that the clothes in the Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà story do
not solely serve as the source of inspiration and motivation for the dramatization and exposition
of immorality, especially in the performances of Egúngún, but they also become the symbols of
identifications through which it recurs to the moral agents, who are members of the audience, that
their past and private worlds have been problematized, dramatized, and psychoanalyzed.
Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy
11
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (XXXV)
The significance of psychoanalysis in the moral play of Eégún4 is to reveal our unbecoming moral
attitudes to ourselves. It goes without the Yorùbá saying that tójú bá sepin amá nyọ ́ han ojú ni –
when the eyes oozed mucus, we will remove the discharge to show it to the eyes.” Suffice it to say,
it is possible for the eyes not to feel the effects of their own discharge, but it might be difficult for
them to see and know the nature of what oozes from within itself without removing and showing
it to the eyes. The Yorùbá aesthetic-ethical concept of showing the eyes their own discharge forms
the basis for Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic argument that a mentally imbalanced patient can be
healed through the process of interrogating their past and unconscious experience. However, my
understanding of that psychoanalytic concept which becomes the major discovery in Freud’s
psychoanalysis is based on the Yorùbá saying, “ọjọ ́ tí wèrè bámọ ̀ pé wèrè lòun, ojọ ́ nà lara ẹ ̀ yá – An
insane person becomes sane the moment or the day they realize they were insane.”
To Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn film-philosophers, the aesthetic-ethical problems are not unconnected with the
fact that human beings are naturally selfish; and to Iris Murdock, “how can we make ourselves
better? is the question moral philosophers should attempt to answer.” (Murdock 1985: 78).
Meanwhile, the critical tradition that can make us better is what Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn film-philosophers
met. In the Yorùbá world, the critical tradition is part and parcel of Egúngún performative
expression and experience. Thus, when people ask: who steals your clothes? The woman’s
response that it is the unknown. That question leads to another question: what is the unknown?
One is Eégún and the other is Orò, she answers. If one does not know how to bathe, who steals
their clothes? They ask Eégún. Eégún denies the stealing of the clothes because Egúngún moral
plays indirectly dramatize and interpret unbecoming moral attitudes without naming the moral
agent(s) of ridicule. With that in mind, everyone thinks that Egúngún moral plays have exposed
their moral nakedness, even when the object of ridicule is an important figure in the community.
But as the Yorùbá saying goes the king does not arrest a performer. In other words, it is believed
that a performer had never been arrested for being critical of prominent characters while
performing/acting. We can understand Eégún’s ignorance of stealing within the context of what
Linsey McGoey conceives as “ignorance as emancipation” (McGoey 2012). This idea of ignorance
as emancipation allows Eégún to freely criticize prominent characters without being penalized.
But unlike Eégún, Orò is a patriarch deity whose ritual performance is done in secret. It is believed
that Ọrò doesn’t steal. In fact, a sacrifice is offered to Orò while searching for stolen items within
the Yorùbá communities because it is believed that Orò would find the items and punish the
culprit(s). So, it is already sufficiented that Orò does not engage in the public business of
dramatization in the interest of morality. However, it is based on moral reasons that Eégún
exposes unbecoming moral behaviors; and that is the reason why people pray to Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà to avert
the shame that comes with such moral plays. It is believed that shame is more tragic than death.
The morality in the artistic expression of Eégún formed the basis for the manifestations of
Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà moral philosophy.
In Túndé Kèlání’s Saworoidẹ, it is evident that ‘Lápite ́ is the archetype of a twins’ mother whose
garments of shame are stolen and displayed in the film. As the name implies, – ‘Lápite ́ means – Ọlá
– royalty – tó – that – pi-te ́ – is built on the foundation of shame. As explained earlier, his rejection
of the ritual of coronation that makes a new king does not solely negate the socio-political
tradition or system of check and balance, (that binds the king to his people as well as the past to
the present), but also desecrates the very foundation upon which his kingship and kingdom were
4 Eégún is the short form for Egúngún as they can be used interchangeably. But Eégún is often used for performer while
Egúngún is the festival.
12
What is Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy?
built. It is important to stress here that adé idẹ (a brass crown) represents the kingship and the
king; ìlù saworoidẹ (a drum with brass jingle bells) stands for the voice of the people; and àdó idẹ
(a small brass container) symbolizes the strong bond between adé idẹ and ìlù saworoidẹ because
it contains the strong links (which is used for incisions and oath-taking), that binds a new king to
his predecessors or ancestors as well as his people. So, to reject the very metaphysical meanings
that connect one to his people is to disconnect oneself from the voice of the people; and to
disconnect self from the voice of the people is to disagree with, and disrupt, the very foundation
that gives one voice. As the Yorùbá saying goes, ohùn èèyàn ni ohùn ọlo ́run – the voice of the
people is the voice of the God; and a tree does not make a forest. That would explain why it is
believed that ‘Lápite ́’s kingship is not only isolated metaphysically from the kingdom but also built
on the foundation of shame that always ends in nothing other than itself.
Like the èjìgbèdè e ̀kú that facilitates the dialogue between the dead and the living, ‘Lápite ́’s
costume and costume props symbolize the physicality, without presence, of the past and unknown
beings/characters in the physical material world. It is based on philosophical reflections that the
Yorùbá, like other Africans, give symbolic images or voices to the past, absent and/or unknown
beings/characters that dwell in the metaphysical world. And the purpose of giving voice to the
past, the absent and the unknown is to learn from them through historical and philosophical
reflections. Such reflections inform the recreations of limitless human archetypes and symbolic
ideas in which Yoruba cineastes such as Tunde Kelani, Femi Lasode, Biyi Bandele and Kunle
Afolayan just to mention a few, give voices back to the past and the unknown.
Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy
13
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (XXXV)
4 Conclusion
The limitlessness of human reflections on our world as well as the recreations of symbolic realities
is critically echoed by Derrida that “it is necessary to recast the concept of text by generalizing it
almost without limit, in any case without present or perceptible limit, without any limit that is”
(Derrida 1986: 165). But the philosophical condition that gives presence to non-presence so that
the living can dialogue with the dead and knowledge to the unknown in order to heal, decolonize,
and to re-moralize the public is central to the Ọ ̀ rúnmìlà oral philosophy of art. It is important to
stress that the conditions of philosophy in the parable of Eégún can be described as the problems
of the unknown whose interpretations are limitless and fundamental to the metaphysical
symbolism of African cinematic storytelling which I call the “Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy.”
14
References
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Paper Series.
Ọ ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy
17
University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers (XXXV)
6 Latest Publications in the Academy Reflects Working Paper Series
Title
Editor(s)
Year
of
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Issue
Ọ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy: An
African
Philosophy
throught
Cinematic Storytelling
Saheed Adesumbo Bello
2023
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and
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at
a
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N. Gez
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colonial Departure to recent Hopes
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von Oppen
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20(4)
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Aychegrew H. Hailu
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urban Kenya
Dieter Neubert and Florian
Stoll
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Bello, Saheed Adesumbo. 2023. Ọ̀ rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy: An African Philosophy
through Cinematic Storytelling. University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers
35, Academy Reflects 9. Bayreuth: Institute of African Studies.
Subjects
People & roles
- Place of publication
- Bayreuth
Origins & context
- Title
- Ọ̀rúnmìliàn Film-Philosophy : An African Philosophy through Cinematic Storytelling
- Publication type
- Working paper
- Language
- English
- Series
- University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers
- Series
- Academy reflects 9
- Date
- 2023
- Number in series
- 35
- pages
- VI, 17
- Number of pages
- 17
Identifiers & sources
- Source ID (eref-/epub-)
- eref-75311
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