Local perceptions on Migration Control and Local Economy in the Kantchari-Makalondi Borderland

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Speaker 1: On the go sprint lectures on African mobilities podcast by Africa Multiple.

Speaker 1: Welcome everybody to this sprint lecture that begins the winter semester. Our guest today is Doctor Kamal Donko who is going to give a talk on local perception on migration control and local economy in Kankari and Makalondi borderlands. Doctor Kamal is a former doctoral student at Pictus and also he did his master's studies in the cultural environment in Africa at the University of Cologne. One of his very recent publications is a joint paper with Professor Uli Beisel and Martin Dünchfleck entitled Migration Control, the Local Economy and Violence in the Burkina Faso-Niger Borderland. The paper today is part of a project actually that Kamal and Martin are working on between the borderland between Niger and Burkina Faso. So without much ado, I'll invite Kamal.

Speaker 2: Hi everyone and welcome to my presentation. Adi has already introduced me so I will just start. In my presentation today I would like to report on local perceptions on migration control and local economy in the Kankari-Makalondi borderland. The border crossing was identified as a strategic location of interest by international organizations for migration. The subjects can be looked at under five headings. Headings. I will give you an overview of the EU external borders in West Africa. Next I will focus on criminalization of mobility, how people view and then I will discuss its impacts on the local economy. I go on now to highlight what I see as violent response to criminalisation of mobility and the emergence of poverty. So European Union policies have shaped the evolution of migration motivation patterns and structure across West African states. From slave trade to colonial times, countries within European Union have influenced who, where and for how long people in West Africa moved. This influence continued in post-colonial West African states with the reduced available mobility options for West Africans to European countries to study, to work or reunite with family. But these migration policies have become more restrictive over the years. Consequently, the changes in migration policies between EU and West African countries have resulted in changes in migration patterns and decisions of migrants. Although bilateral migration cooperation between West African and EU states has evolved to reflect these changing patterns, such measures or decisions have had the effect of externalising migration policies on EU states in West African countries like Burkina Faso, Niger. For most migrants and scholars, externalisation of EU migration policy has meant adopting an approach that extends European borders beyond the frontier of African countries and...

Speaker 1: into their internal territories. This has far-reaching impacts on the legal and political systems in those countries and does not necessarily contribute to the intended outcome of migration cooperation. In the light of the Valletta Summit that was in two thousand and fifteen, the Commission drew up a new framework for partnership with third countries in June two thousand and fifteen. The emergency of containing migration flows to Europe motivated the drafting of these policy strategies which outlined the control of reinforced cooperation with countries of origin, transit and destination by mobilising all material and human resources and more generally what is there now, the installation of a new migration control technology called Mida and supported by IOM. There is a strong EU presence in the region through EU Emergency Trust Fund for Stability. Many programmes arise in the region. For instance, EU finances the programme Gestion Intégrée des Ressources Frontalières, brings support for G5 Sahel Joint Force, provides capacity building in support of security and development of those countries. Apart of European border and migration management in West Africa, new control practice has highly modernised and militarised borders restricting the movement of travellers, of migrants, the freedom of establishment and border economies. The various decisions put in place to control illegal cross-border migration, insecurity and the emergence of armed groups in the Kankara-Makalondi area have destabilised migration-related activities and led to the collapse of the economic fabric of the region. Using this borderland as an example, I focus on the relationship between local perception of border management, forced immobility, economic downturn and violence. Generally, perception is seen as the manner by which we make sense of the world, of a phenomenon, a situation, the representation of something to the mind. By using local perception in this paper, I want just to focus on people's judgment and assessment of migration controls that might impose risks to their well-being. My analysis is based on information collected during several visits between April two thousand and eight and September twenty twelve. Data consisted of observation, informal conversation, structured interview with migrants, drivers, border police, immigration officers, brokers, local security guards, shops and restaurants owners. Also, I interviewed local officials. So how do actors perceive these restrictions? Since the Malian crisis, the security crisis of two thousand and twelve, the Kankara-Makalondi border has become an important corridor for international migration. The Ouagadougou-Ptah-Kankara-Niamey axis is experiencing a strong migration flow both

Speaker 1: Kankari and Makalondi are rapidly experiencing too a significant economic boom with the development of several activities linked to that migration. In order to control this large migrational flow, Niger and the Mediterranean countries mobile checkpoints have been set up at the entrance and exit of major cities on the Ouagadougou-Fada-Kankari-Niamey axis since two thousand and fifteen. Patrols are organized along the borders, the informal cross-border routes used for smuggling too. In addition to the migration control technology Mida, that is set for automated collection of biographic and biometric data with documents and fingerprints reader and data exchange with Interpol context, violent repression of activities of smugglers, restriction on mobility, the detention or rejection of undocumented migrants at the border are becoming more and more regular, but above all unbearable. In this regard, one of my former migrant smuggler points out the following: as soon as they learn that you are in contact with migrants or if they know that you are a smuggler, then they come and take you in for questioning. Several smugglers and bus drivers have been arrested and thrown into prison simply because they were trying to bypass the border checkpoints with migrants. Several young people have been forced to flee the region to take refuge in the bush or in forest. They are afraid of being arrested by security forces. The discourses on illegal migration materialize in criminalization of mobility previously tolerated and socially accepted practices associated with profit making and corruption in that area. Whereas previously there was a vibrant migration activity that corrupts borders, passports, local officers, police officers as well as an informal border workers business, the matrix of beneficiaries has now changed. Given the extent of the border, travelers, migrants have to experience this combination of restrictions, controls, harassment and corruption already on their way from Ouagadougou to Kankari and from Kankari to Niger. Migrants, travelers without a Burkinabe passport, for instance, were charged even if they had valid documents from other ECOWAS countries. Those classified as candidates for migration were particularly harassed as they approached the borders even though under ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons and goods, they are in fact allowed to move freely from Burkina Faso to Niger. Those restrictions have really impacted the local economy of the region as follow. The journey of the migrants mainly from Gambia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Senegal, Ghana, Togo and Guinea has resulted in a vibrant migration economy in Kankari since two thousand and fourteen. It has not only attracted businessmen and traders from outside the region, but has also benefited first and foremost the population.

Speaker 1: who have opened hotels, shops and restaurants mediating between border officials and migrants and brought them across the border on motorbikes without checks. But it was not only the informal border workers who benefited, but the local economy as a whole. The economic consequences of criminalising and preventing transport, travel and migration are massive. In an informal conversation with an irregular migration actor, it is said that illegal trafficking was convenient for everyone and especially for us. With this new tool called meters, we can no longer meet some of our commitments. Before there was mutual understanding between drivers and us. Everything was going well. It was a win-win situation for both of us. But now everything has become complicated. Today people find themselves unemployed. The hatred against states and its symbols is real. It is badly thought out by the decision makers in our countries who are in the pay of westerners. I confess that this policy and the repression that followed has plunged everyone into poverty. One must always be afraid to stay, lest to be hungry. He will do anything to reach his objective. Several testimonies obtained on the ground are expressive of the decaying state of the current economy in the cross-border area. Before evening, every evening, I had three people on my bike to help them cross borders. I used to do two tours per day for five thousand CFA. Each migrant had to pay me. To take them from Kankari to Makalondi, I would sometimes take up to twenty thousand francs CFA. I helped the lots and am proud of it. They all want to go to Europe. It is obvious. Another statement says that women, young people are all from the migration path through Kankari. The population had enough opportunities to earn money. We, the youth, were doing very well. Our land is not fertile. So helping the migrants brought us a lot of money. Also, our women were selling in the streets, doing their own business. There were bars everywhere and prostitution corners too. Kankari was really good. Now, one life, everything is ruined. Desperation at the way in which change has plunged everyone into poverty has also strengthened locally, local militias and violent reactions against the state sanctions, reorganisation of the local migration economy. Response to migration control are becoming increasingly violent and there are numerous attempts to drive the armies and state forces out of the area. So this is the current situation on that area. One of the sources of violence in the region is the major decision taken by Burkina and Niger governments to curb the high level of illegal cross-border migration to Europe. Some young people interviewed on the issue of migration control are nostalgic for the years when the activity was in full swing. And one of them says, the passage of migration in our region helped us a lot. We were able to help our parents and feed our families. But since Niger and Burkina Faso started punishing people and sending them to...

Speaker 1: prison poverty has set in. First testimony show that the migration control followed by the strong repression against those involved in migrant smuggling have dealt heavy blow to local economic activities. In conclusion, I will say that in Kankari Makalondi region border practices focus on the idea of restricting and controlling mobility to contain international migration to Europe. Burkina Faso and Niger are trying to turn the local borders into the global border by the support of EU. The results has been a decline in the local economy of this border area with various forms of violence and strong aggression of the people to security forces. The state seem to be doing nothing to support these businessmen, those businessmen which are currently experiencing difficulty due to insecurity. In addition to the restriction induced by the migration control, the region faces curfew and a ban of motorbike from six p.m. in Kankari and a total ban of fare on motorbike on the Makalondi side. These decisions restricting mobility are in fact sources of the new form of insecurity because they thrust many households into poverty and recrimination against the central state and the security forces are on the rise. Thank you so much.

Speaker 2: Thank you very much Kamal. Very complex situation you're describing there and very interesting work you've been doing for I think for a good number of years now. From my understanding, this is really a very interesting way of what I would call governing migration, governing mobility at a distance. So you don't have to be very close at the site to manage who moves where and what way. We'll take questions now and I saw, let me see the hands up, I saw Johan's hand was up. Yeah Johan. Johan, I mean, sorry.

Speaker 3: Okay, thank you. One question, I was, you said you're looking at the people's judgments and perceptions on the ground. And I was wondering, which level are they addressing when they are complaining? Because they see this economic downturn and that came out really clear, but whom are they blaming for it? Are they, do they say okay, this is the European Union or IOM or is it, or do they more address the local police or the national government? So that would be my question. Thank you.

Speaker 1: Okay. They blame first of all their states, governments. And in addition to their states, the European Union. But in doing so, they are much more selective. So we are in French countries. So it is much France is always accused.

Speaker 4: Thank you very much Kamal. That was so interesting and I have maybe a similar question like Johan about the different levels, but also about the different temporalities. So I thought, I actually not knowing this current border situation in that region so well, I was kind of even surprised that the, that you know, Europe must be very happy with how, you know, the state is dealing with this border control because this is exactly what the European Union has been trying, right? To restrict migration, to have stronger controls, to have the countries in charge and to hinder, you know, personal gains made from this border traffic. So this seems to be extremely efficient. And I wondered on the one hand how actually...

Speaker 1: On the state level, what is the incentive to be so strict? I mean, what does the state government get for being so strict? Because I can imagine that even, you know, government agents are normally implied into this cross-border trade, smuggle, get some kind of money out of it. So to really take business opportunities from a marginalised border region, marginalised in some sense, the state government must have a strong incentive. So I'm asking on the level of the state, how come that they bring in these measures so strictly? And a second question would be the temporality. So could you say when this migration business started to be so effective and so important for the border region? What was before? Because I mean, cross-border smuggle and cross-border business has always been there, I think. So when was particularly this migration business getting so strong and how does it, how is it channelled now? Is it really stopping or do people take other roads or other measures to to cross borders or is it really kind of ending this kind of business or is other forms of business, are other forms of cross-border business returning something like that? So the temporality of border business would be the second question. And thank you again for this very great presentation.

Speaker 2: Thank you very much Andrea and thank you for the questions also. The cooperation between EU and those African countries is a win-win cooperation. Through emergency response for stability, EU finance many programs in the region. They help also, they provide as I said, capacity building in support of security and development. And in most of their annual budget, those countries also get help from EU. So it is all those things put them in a win-win situation. From the interviews and informal conversations, always they see France that is leading the whole process to control migration and stuff. I don't know whether it is clear or maybe you should come up with a question to...

Speaker 1: No, thank you very much. That was that was very clear. And and maybe just about the temporality. Yeah, thank you.

Speaker 2: Okay, thank you. Before, people were interacting on the axis of Ouagadougou, Fada, Kankara, Makalondi, Niamey. They used to pass through the Tillabéri region. So the border between Mali and Burkina Faso, Burkina Faso and Mali. But with the two thousand and twelve Malian security crisis, the migrants have now started to pass through Fada and find themselves in Kankara and Makalondi. So from two thousand and twelve until two thousand and eighteen where they established that migration control called Mida, there was a very important migration flow. And the local economy, the economy has been really really fruitful. But since two thousand and eighteen, with the advent of Mida, things have become more complicated with the patrols and the restrictions. So up to now, now the current situation is that there is a lot of insecurity. And in two thousand and twenty, one of the border checkpoints has been destroyed by unknown people and later security forces in that area, they had to move from this area to be closer to Kankara city.

Speaker 1: So, that is the current situation there.

Speaker 2: Thank you so much. I think this is a perfect example of how we have to really think in multi scalar ways, how things influence each other, right? On global, well EU, Africa, internal African states, and then very smaller border communities, how this political economy is so linked up. And this is a perfect example. And thank you very much.

Speaker 1: Thank you, Andrea.

Speaker 3: Okay, maybe I ask one question. Kamal, what do you see to be the future of these changing dynamics of migration control? Do you think, like I could follow up from what Andrea asked, is there any other possibility of pockets of routes coming up because there has to be alternatives to survival, of course. So what do you see as the future implication of this kind of migration control within the two regions or even beyond? Could the people who are moving, like from Niger, I don't know the border dynamics, could those people who are moving using these routes change their alternatives and try to go elsewhere or you think they are going to come some smaller, smaller micro-routes adjacent to the border control?

Speaker 1: Okay, thank you very much, Fadi. Migrants have always a goal to reach. So they always come up with new alternative. So the Kanchari-Makalondi border is now full of insecurity and the borders are closed because of COVID. Motorbikes could not freely move, transport people and goods. So most of the migrants are now switching to Benin. So they pass through, some of them pass through Cotonou or they pass through Togo, they come in Benin, Parakou and find themselves in Malanville. From Malanville, now they reach into Gaya. Malanville is a border between Benin and Niger. So still European Union now to prevent all those new routes are trying to establish everywhere that new technology called MIDAS. So last, in November, I was in the border between Niger and Benin and I realized that MIDAS now has established those new technologies there. And it is the same thing they are trying to do in the border between Benin and Nigeria too. So they are trying to establish those MIDAS technologies to stop or at least reduce the migration flow to Mediterranean, to Europe.

Speaker 3: Well, just yeah, thank you. I understand that and there are possibilities of these alternating routes and trying, of course, the state will have to continue the mechanisms of control, will have to continue moving with the different pockets that will be arising. But now I am thinking, what about cases of, for example, corruption within the system where state operatives, for me, I now think about the illegal migration economy that was thriving in that area has now been moved potentially to politicians and the policymakers who will still try to bypass this technology of migration control by incentivising potential migrants who pay them directly instead of using the local migration operatives around there. Do you think this is something that could arise into creating a bit of an elitist mobility economy where it is the people in government who are now benefiting directly from negotiating migration for would-be migrants?

Speaker 1: Yes. Well, let me say that those security forces around the borders are well paid nowadays. They are well paid. EU has set up a budget to reorganize the security forces that deal with the border control issues and then provide them with money and materials to do their work. I know it is not easy because technology, even in Kanchari, for instance, they have tried to destroy the...

Speaker 1: technology because when they start using it, they realize that they cannot get money easily. Money, they cannot do corruption become difficult. They cannot negotiate with migrants and gain money. So they have tried to destroy it. And I remember that one of the border policemen told me that Germany has tried to give them an internship to show them how they have to be more patriotic and they started to show them how with controlling those borders, they can also prevent insecurity. So this also has helped. They have changed their minds. But I don't want to say that with those internships and because they have been well paid, there will stop corruption. No, it will still be there. As currently, the area is messed up. So they deal about insecurity. The local people try to push the local security forces out of that area so that they can do their business. So this is the fight which is going on currently in that region. So most of the attacks are oriented against the security forces for now.

Speaker 2: Yeah, thank you very much, Kamal. Okay. Yeah, thank you, thank you, thank you.

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Speaker 2: This was On the Go: Frontiers and African Mobilities.

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